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STUDENT VERSUS UNIVERSITY: THE UNIVERSITY'S IMPLIED
OBLIGATIONS OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
HAZEL GLENN BEH*
Consider the higher education product from the consumer per-
spective: Despite the time and expense you invest, there are no guar-
antees that you will find the experience useful or enjoyable. You may
not succeed, and failure may come early or late in your college career.
Failure will be attributed to your own intellectual or character defi-
ciencies; inferior teaching is not an excuse nor grounds for a refund
of your tuition. The measures of success will be developed unilaterally
by the institution and kept a closely guarded secret from you. Should
you fail, review or appeal is virtually foreclosed, for a professor's award
of grades and the institution's conferral of degrees is accorded great
deference. The stigma of failure may dog you for the rest of your life;
you will probably have to disclose your failure to every potential em-
ployer with whom you seek work. Although you will be held to a high
standard of ethics, and you must comply strictly with all of the condi-
tions that the institution specifies is necessary to earn a degree, the
institution, on the other hand, reserves the right to change anything it
has promised you without notice. Despite your investment of
thousands of dollars and years of your life, the educational product
offers a mere chance at success but holds no guarantees. Finally, stu-
dents are not invited to bargain with the institution over the terms
and the conditions of the educational contract-a contract that is
largely implied or finds its terms scattered throughout various unread-
able publications that contain fine print disclaimers of institutional
liability.
Postsecondary institutions serve important societal interests,' and
courts accord them extreme deference when judging their relations
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1. See generally RUDOLPH H. WEINGARTNER, THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF ACADEMIC AD-
MINISTRATION 1-31 (1999) (discussing the competing tensions between the institution's so-
cietal obligations and the institution's obligations to students). See also Daniel Noah Moses,
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with students.2 Courts have only reluctantly and begrudgingly em-
ployed contract principles to adjudicate claims by disappointed stu-
dents when institutions of higher education fail to abide by their
promises or to meet student expectations; courts often complain that
contract law is too inflexible either to capture the complexity of the
student-university relationship or to provide sufficient latitude to insti-
tutional decision making.3 Moreover, courts have nearly uniformly re-
jected educational malpractice claims, refusing to intrude into either
the classroom or the management of the educational institution.4
This Article argues that while acceding to the institution's desire
to preserve its autonomy and its authority to carry out its educational
missions, when courts accord too much deference to the institution,
they abrogate judicial responsibility to protect students.5
This Article argues that the work horses of contract law, the im-
plied obligations of good faith and fair dealing, hold the potential to
define and to police the student-university relationship while avoiding
Distinguishing a University from a Shopping Mall, 15 THOUGHT & AcTION 85 (1999) (tracing
the historical role played by institutions of higher education and noting their increasing
consumer orientation).
2. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial tendency to
grant educational institutions significant latitude when dealing with students and noting
journal articles that debate the ineffectiveness of contract theory in protecting student
interests).
3. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626-27 (10th Cir. 1975) (re-
versing the district court's rigid application of the commercial contract doctrine and up-
holding the university's expulsion of a student); Marquez v. University of Wash., 648 P.2d
94, 96 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (commenting that, while the student-university relationship is
"primarily contractual, ... '[t] his does not mean that contract law must be rigidly applied
in all its aspects"' because "'[t]he student-university relationship is unique, and it should
not be and can not be stuffed into one doctrinal category'" (quoting Lyons v. Salve Regina
College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1972))); see also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE,
THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION § 4.1.3, at 373 n.1, 373-77 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter LAw
OF HIGHER EDUCATION] (discussing the student-university relationship and noting that
"contract theory is by far the primary theory for according legal status to students beyond
that derived from the Constitution and state and federal statutes"). Seegenerally MICHAEL A.
OLIVAS, THE LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON COLLEGES IN COURT
631-89 (2d ed. 1997) (exploring the range of legal relationships between colleges and
students).
4. See infra notes 143-173 and accompanying text (discussing whether educational
malpractice is a viable theory of tort liability and citing cases illustratingjudicial reluctance
toward educational malpractice claims).
5. Cf Hazel G. Beh, Downsizing Higher Education and Derailing Student Educational Objec-
tives: When Should Student Claims for Program Closures Succeed?, 33 GA. L. REV. 155, 160
(1998) (analyzing the negative effects of viewing the student-university relationship as a
semester-long relationship and the positive effects of viewing that relationship as an im-
plied-in-law contract which "affords students some protection while also allowing the uni-
versity to protect other societal interests associated with the operation and preservation of
a university" (footnote omitted)).
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the pitfalls of judicially second-guessing and intruding into the man-
agement of the institution or into its academic freedoms.6 Part I of
this Article explores the changing nature of education, suggesting
that increasing consumerism and competition justifies less deference
and more judicial involvement in higher education disputes between
students and their schools. Part II discusses claims against universities
based on educational malpractice and on breach of contract. This
section explores judicial reluctance to intrude into management and
into educational decisions and the resulting lack of a constructive and
satisfactory judicial role. Part II concludes by discussing a few of the
university-student contract cases where contract law's good faith and
fair dealing obligations have offered a comfortable and workable
method to regulate the educational contract without substituting the
court's judgment for the institution's own best judgment. By holding
schools to the morals of their own marketplace, 7 courts can protect a
student's legitimate and reasonable expectations and hold institutions
accountable for their abuses without diminishing the value of the uni-
versity as a social institution.
I. THE CHANGING NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Increasingly, higher education is viewed and views itself as a busi-
ness with education as its a product.8 For many years, postsecondary
6. This Article attempts to avoid discussion of cases that are clearly grounded in aca-
demic freedom issues such as grade challenges and disciplinary matters. Instead, this Arti-
cle examines claims based upon allegations that the postsecondary institution promised
something that it did not deliver.
7. See generally Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 107-09 (1993) (discussing the role ethical standards
play in the marketplace). For various interpretations and applications of the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing, see StevenJ. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty
toPeform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 388-89 (1980), inferring good faith from "the
ordinary course of business and customary practice." See also Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual
Study of Commercial Good-Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PiTr. L. REv.
381, 400-09 (1978) (discussing various definitions of good faith and attempting to clarify
the concept of good faith through the vehicle of insurance cases); Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. REv. 195, 195 (1968) [hereinafter "Good Faith" in General Contract Law] (commenting
that the general enforceability of promises is derived from the basic principle that individu-
als should act in good faith toward those with whom they deal); Robert S. Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 835
(1982) [hereinafter General Duty of Good Faith] (analyzing the potential effects of adopting
a Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Section of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
to general contract law).
8. See Andre v. Pace Univ., 618 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979 (City Ct. 1994), rev'd, 655 N.Y.S.2d
777 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that "Colleges and Universities are in the business of market-
ing and delivering educational services and Degrees to the general public"); THE NEW
2000]
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schools regarded themselves as above the marketplace, serving lofty
and important societal interests, unconcerned with competition for
students or pandering to student interests.9 As a result of the institu-
tion's elevated societal status, courts traditionally have accorded post-
secondary schools broad discretion and latitude to educate and to
treat students as they deem appropriate. 0
GUIDE TO STUDENT RECRUITMENT MARKETING (Virginia Carter Smith & Susan Hunt, eds.,
1986) [hereinafter STUDENT RECRUITMENT] (noting the stiff competition that admissions
officers face in soliciting and in attracting the business of graduating high school seniors);
THOMASJ. AUDLEY & CHARLES F. DoRLAc, INTERVIEWING METHODS FOR ENROLLING, GUIDING
AND RETAINING STUDENTS 3 (1991) (discussing the need for college officials to employ ef-
fective marketing efforts to attract the "[i]ncreasingly discriminating buyers of the Ameri-
can marketplace"); David Brodigan & George Dehne, Data for Effective Marketing in an
Uncertain Future, J.C. ADMISSION, Spring 1997, at 16, 18-20 (stressing the importance of a
university understanding its audience as a prerequisite to effective marketing plans);Jody
Johnson & David Sallee, Marketing Your College as an Intangible Product, J.C. ADMISSION, Sum-
mer 1994, at 16, 20 (examining colleges' use of personal marketing to differentiate them-
selves and to capitalize on their strengths); Robert E. Johnson, Where Consumer Has Become
King, TRUSTEESHIP, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 26 (examining higher education marketing as a re-
sponse to intense consumer pressure); John Martin & Thomas Moore, Problem Analysis:
Application in Developing Marketing Strategies for Colleges, 66 C. & UNIV. 233, 234 (1991) (dis-
cussing the value of using market information to attract and to keep students); Richard A.
Matasar, A Commercialist Manifesto: Entrepreneurs, Academics, and Purity of the Heart and Soul,
48 FLA. L. REv. 781, 792-93 (1996) (describing higher education as a commercial activity);
Mark S. Neustadt, Is Marketing Good for Education?, J.C. ADMISSION, Winter 1994, at 17, 22
(concluding that the exercise of marketing techniques to articulate an institution's view of
its core educational experience is productive if it hones the institution's sense of what it is
and what it is not providing); Robert Zemsky et al., In Search of Strategic Perspective: A Toolfor
Mapping the Market in Postsecondary Education, 29 CHANCE 23, 35 (1997) (commenting that
increasingly, college consumers "see themselves as shoppers ... search[ing] for the best
price, the most convenient time, and the most appropriate place").
Students also market themselves to colleges by taking entrance exam preparatory
courses and hiring private admissions consultants. See Patricia McDonough & Larry Rob-
ertson, Reclaiming the Educational Role of Chief Admissions Officers, J.C. ADMISSION, Spring
1995, at 23, 24 (noting the changing role of admissions officers from a once quasi-
academic profession to a largely administrative profession).
9. Cf Matasar, supra note 8, at 783 (urging the acceptance of the "reality by institu-
tions of higher education that commercialism exists within these institutions"); Neustadt,
supra note 8, at 17 (discussing faculty opinions on the marketing trend and noting that
some believe marketing has "little or nothing to contribute to the ultimate mission of [an
educational] institution").
10. See LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, § 1.2, at 4-7 (discussing the evolution
of higher education suits and noting thejudiciary's reluctance to part from its traditional
hands-off approach); OLIVAS, supra note 3, at 631-34 (examining patterns in higher educa-
tion litigation and noting that students seldom prevail in these suits); William A. Kaplin,
Law on the Campus, 1960-1985: Years of Growth and Challenge, 12J.C. & U.L. 269, 272 (1985)
(noting that "[t]raditionally, the law accorded postsecondary institutions extensive auton-
omy" and that "[t] he judiciary developed various doctrines" to protect the autonomy of the
institutions); see also Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second
Thoughts on the Third "Essential Freedom," 45 STAN. L. REv. 1835, 1856 (1993) (discussing
professors' wide discretion in formulating teaching methods).
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Times have changed. Since the 1960s, there has been a tremen-
dous growth in higher education. Between 1960 and 1990, the
number of institutions of higher education increased by fifty-seven
percent, from 2008 to 3535.11 The number of college students also
swelled by 346 percent, from 'just over" 4.1 million in 1961 to almost
14.2 million in 1991.12 During these decades, the college age cohort
also ebbed and flowed as it always does, resulting in years of keen
competition for students as well as years of high demand.1 3 In years of
low demand, there is an increased risk of sharp recruitment practices
such as disparaging competitors and misleading students.14 The
proliferation of colleges means that student choice now drives the re-
cruitment scene; colleges must actively market themselves to stand
apart and can no longer simply wait for student applications. 15
Although marketing is no longer a dirty word in higher educa-
tion, ethical and appropriate marketing tactics remain a subject of de-
bate. 16 While in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, institutions
developed new academic programs and majors to attract new stu-
dents,1 7 increasingly colleges rely on marketing, and particularly on
"image" marketing to promote their schools."8 As one commentator
described the current state, colleges seek "to differentiate themselves
in an increasingly crowded playing field," by becoming "active market-
11. See McDonough & Robertson, supra note 8, at 24.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 25 (discussing studies of admission officers undertaken in the 19 60s,
1970s, and 1980s and noting the changing concerns and conclusions of each).
14. See id.; Nancy Harper, Why We Need Marketing: An Interview With Philip Kotler, in
STUDENrT RECRUITMENrT, supra note 8, at 17 (discussing the "hard-sell approach" and noting
its use by "troubled colleges").
15. See Martin & Moore, supra note 8, at 233-34 (considering how "colleges need mar-
ket information for making decisions which enhance their ability to retain and attract stu-
dents" and addressing strategies for colleges and for universities to implement to remain
competitive under the current market conditions).
16. See Harper, supra note 14, at 18 (discussing ethical issues associated with marketing
focused on "selling and manipulation," as opposed to those associated with "research and
response").
17. See Neustadt, supra note 8, at 19 ("During the sixties and seventies, colleges and
universities sought to attract students by investing in new academic programs and ma-
jors."); see also Zemsky, supra note 8, at 23 (noting the "build it, they will come" philosophy
in higher education that marked the period from the end of World War II through the
early 1970s).
18. See Zemsky, supra note 8, at 23 (commenting that the 1970s witnessed an onslaught
of marketing as institutions worried that their expanded capacity had exceeded the de-
mand for higher education); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text (describing im-
age marketing).
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eers in pursuit of the finite number of young people undertaking a
four-year education."' 9
Colleges entice students through both printed material and per-
sonal contacts. 20  "Personal marketing" occurs when university em-
ployees such as admissions officers, faculty members, and coaches
make personal contact through e-mail, letters, telephone calls, and/or
campus visits. 2 ' These personal contacts are highly touted marketing
tools with a goal of influencing student choice. 22 During the personal
contacts between students and admissions officers, many specific rep-
resentations are often made.23
19. See Zemsky, supra note 8, at 23.
20. The amount of communication between the school and the student is great. One
small school with an enrollment of under 1500 (in 1986) described the recruitment cam-
paign as including "200,000 personalized letters, 11,000 phone calls, and 500 high school
and college night visits." See R. Dana Paul & Ken Stark, The Mixmasters, in STUDENT RE-
CRUITMENT, supra note 8, at 9-10 (describing recruitment efforts of Adrian College in
Adrian, Michigan).
21. With a focus on consumers, personal contact is ever more important, including e-
mail to admissions officers and to faculty during recruitment, and segmented marketing
via the Internet. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 28-29 (discussing the impact of personal
communications and of "changing communication technologies" in higher education mar-
keting); M. Fredric Volkmann, Avoiding the Impersonal Touch, in STUDENT RECRUITMENT,
supra note 8, at 51 (noting how to personalize recruitment by establishing "one-to-one
relationships with carefully targeted audiences"); William H. Turner, Admission: Possible, in
STUDENT RECRUITMENT, supra note 8, at 53 (discussing the need for admissions officers to
personalize contact with prospective students through mailings, phone calls, and face-to-
face contacts); Johnson & Sallee, supra note 8, at 18-19 (emphasizing the importance of
personal marketing in convincing students that the product-the university-is worthy of
their enrollment).
22. See AUDLEY & DoRIuc, supra note 8, at 66 (stating that "[t]he objective of the
recruiting interview is to influence the student to choose a particular college");Johnson &
Sallee, supra note 8, at 29 (noting that "[a]dmissions counselors who personally call ac-
cepted students with the good news will retain a marketing advantage" and stating that
"[f]aculty who are accessible to prospective and current students and willing to engage
them in conversation help project a student-friendly culture").
23. The following example, explaining how best to respond to an applicant's question
about the student-faculty ratio, demonstrates how recruiters are advised to become more
effective in personal marketing contacts:
The ratio is 13:1. (Give this as a reference point and as an answer to the direct
question.) But the important issue is the number of students in each class and
how well you get to know the professor. The published ratio does not mean
much if the classes on any level are too large. For example, freshman English
closes at 25. If we get too many students, we add sections. Old Testament closes
at 45. Psychology closes at 40. The largest class you would have would likely be
the sophomore course, Western Civ. at 66 .... (This educates the students to an
important issue, setting an expectation, on which we look good. It also enhances
your credibility by showing that you know these details. These figures and exam-
ples are also memorable. Another important point to remember is that all classes
are taught by professors, not grad assistants. Let me tell you about Dr. Mitchell
[VoL. 59:183
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Colleges also market themselves and make representations and
promises to students through printed materials, most notably the cata-
log.2 4 The college catalog attempts to serve many marketing and edu-
cational purposes; many criticize the college catalog because it seldom
achieves its goals and often creates uncertainty and confusion. 25 The
catalog is intended to inform students of the college's expectations
and to advise students of the requirements and the standards of the
college.26 The catalog describes the educational offerings and the
other resources of the institution.
Also chief among the catalog's functions is advertisement. As
marketing and advertising tools, catalogs, "contain[ ] profusions of
econiums on the goodness of the institutions, their high objectives,
[and] the profundity of their professors. '27 The catalog also tries to
convey the substance of the agreement between the student and the
university, or at the least, the expectations that the student should
.... (This answer concludes with a concrete example that illustrates that our
faculty care about their students, especially freshmen).
Johnson & Sallee, supra note 8, at 19-20 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also AUDLEY
& DoRLAc, supra note 8, at 3-7 (describing personalized marketing techniques in college
recruitment as a recent development).
24. See Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Ct. App. 1972) (stat-
ing that "catalogs, bulletins, circulars, and institutional regulations become part of the [stu-
dent-university] contract"); David Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From Shield to
Sword?,J.C. & U.L. 201, 202 (1985) (describing the development of the college catalog as a
basis for legal liability and noting that the "typical catalog . . . contain[s] policies and
procedures concerning admissions, financial aid, registration and academic and discipli-
nary matters" (citing Peterson, Legal Responsibilities and Contractual Obligations Imposed on a
University by its Catalog, 56 C. &J. 254 (1981))).
25. See generally Robert L. Cherry, Jr. & John P. Geary, The College Catalog as a Contract,
21 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 30 (1992) (noting that because many catalogs are not published yearly,
information is often outdated and inaccurate); Davenport, supra note 24, at 204-06 (dis-
cussing cases in which students have brought suits based, in part, on catalog misrepresenta-
tion); Eileen K. Jennings, Breach of Contract Suits by Students Against Postsecondary Education
Institutions: Can They Succeed?, 7J.C. & U.L. 191, 200 (1980) (discussing student-university
suits in which the catalog provision in question is nonspecific or missing, and noting that
in such cases, "courts are likely to uphold the college procedure, so long as it is not arbi-
trary or an abuse of discretion"); Marty Terrill &James 0. Hammons, Can They? Will They?
Did They? Probably Not. College Students and College Catalogs, J.C. ADMisSIoNS, Spring 1996, at
2 (remarking that catalogs are "often published but never read" because they are "written
by the institution, about the institution and for the institution").
26. See Davenport, supra note 24, at 202 (noting that the typical college catalog con-
tains the institution's policies and procedures for a variety of matters such as academics
and financial aid); Terrill & Hammons, supra note 25, at 2 (listing some common topics
covered in college catalogs and noting that catalogs often pay specific attention to the
.rules, regulations, policies and concerns of the institution").
27. Davenport, supra note 24, at 202 (quoting Harper, Catalogs and the Law, 49 CoMmu-
Nrrv &JR. L.J. 3 (1978)).
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have of the institution and vice versa. 8 Catalogs often contain dull,
technically written descriptions of courses, degree requirements,
schedules, and procedures.29 In fact (and ironically), catalogs require
advanced reading comprehension skills, well beyond that of their in-
tended student market.3" As one critic commented, "[c]ollege and
university catalogs may well belong on the list of 'often published but
never read' books.
31
Importantly, between the "pictures in the front [and] the listing
of courses in the back," catalogs have "many pages of promises [and]
representations. "32 Yet notably, within their printed material, colleges
often disclaim their own liability and reserve the right to change any-
thing about the program without notice. 33 These reservations are
quite broad, so that in the end, the institution promises the student
nothing at all:
The University reserves the right in its sole judgment to
make changes of any nature in the University's academic
program, courses, schedule, or calendar whenever in its sole
judgment it is deemed desirable to do so. The University
also reserves the right to shift colleges, schools, institutes,
programs, departments, or courses from one to another of
its campuses. The foregoing changes may include, without
limitation, the elimination of colleges, schools, institutes,
programs, departments, or courses, the modification of the
contents of any of the foregoing, the rescheduling of classes,
with or without extending the announced academic term,
the cancellation of scheduled classes, or other academic
activities.3 4
28. See id. at 208 ("Although it is not generally labeled as a contract and the parties do
not sign it, the catalog is widely considered the central document in the university-student
contractual relationship." (footnote omitted)).
29. See Terrill & Hammons, supra note 25, at 2 (describing college catalogs as "boring"
as well as "difficult to use" and "confusing").
30. Id. (reporting on an analysis of 21 college catalogs which concluded that the aver-
age reader would need a comprehension level comparable to that of a college graduate to
read and to comprehend the catalogs).
31. Id.; see also supra notes 24-25.
32. Davenport, supra note 24, at 201.
33. SeeBeh, supra note 5, at 180-81 (noting that college catalogs often disclaim contrac-
tual obligations); Davenport, supra note 24, at 219-21 (discussing cases in which universities
modified their programs described in their catalogs and noting that courts often give
"great deference toward the university's need for academic flexibility" in such modification
cases).
34. Beukas v. Board of Trustees, 605 A.2d 708, 708-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(quoting FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY GRADUATE STUDIES BULLETIN 1989); see also
Thornton v. Harvard Univ., 2 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92-95 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding that represen-
tations and promises contained within a law school's catalog did not create a binding con-
[VOL. 59:183
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Colleges make both very vague and very specific promises and
representations to students in their printed literature and in personal
contacts. At a general level, colleges promise to educate and to en-
hance the student's life and character.3 5 More specifically, the institu-
tion might also inform students of the faculty-student ratio, the
credentials of its faculty, the value of a degree, the costs of education,
the courses offered, and the specific degree requirements of the
institution. 6
Institutions are at best schizophrenic in how they promote them-
selves, for all the while they are promising a great deal, they are also
disclaiming most of those same promises. For example, as a recent
marketing tool to enhance the perception of accountability and to
improve "public notions about the educational barriers that prevent
students from graduating in generally accepted time periods," col-
leges have begun to offer "four-year degree guarantees" that promise
students who follow a prescribed plan that they can complete their
degrees within four years.3 7 Yet, the remedies for the institution's fail-
ure to meet its obligations are expressly limited or nonexistent in
tract where it referred the reader to a financial aid guide that reserved the school's right to
change any terms of assistance to students); Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d
1364, 1366-67 (D.C. 1977) (relying on a reservation of rights clause to justify an abrupt and
marked tuition increase at a medical school); Eisele v. Ayers, 381 N.E.2d 21, 26 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978) (upholding a university's reservation to increase tuition); Laura Krugman Ray,
Toward Contractual Rights for College Students, 10J.L. & EDUc. 163, 171 (1981) (noting vari-
ous ways courts interpret student-university contracts in favor of the institution).
In addition to reserving the right to change anything and everything, some catalogs
specifically disclaim contractual liability as well. See Tobias v. University of Texas, 824
S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex. App. 1991) (upholding a catalog provision that gave "express notice
that '[t]he provisions of this catalog do not constitute a contract, express or implied, be-
tween any applicant, student, or faculty member and The University of Texas at Arlington
or The University of Texas System'" (quoting UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON CATALOG
1985)).
35. Cf Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 148 A.2d 63, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1959) (holding that a college's promise to teach wisdom cannot be relied upon in a
suit for misrepresentation).
36. Cf Johnson & Sallee, supra note 8, at 19 (explaining that admissions counselors can
be more effective when responding to student questions by relaying facts, features, and
benefits of the university with concrete language and anecdotes).
37. F. King Alexander, Four-Year Undergraduate Degree Guarantees: A Comparative Inquiry
(1998) (unpublished paper on file with author). Some guarantees provide that the univer-
sity will waive or substitute requirements or pay tuition if promised courses are unavailable.
Others, however, provide no remedy despite making very specific promises about course
availability. See id. (discussing and comparing four-year guarantees at the University of
California, University of Iowa, Indiana University, University of Minnesota Twin Cities, and
University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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most of these,38 thus making these graduation guarantees better mar-
keting tools than true contractual promises.
In addition to making specific promises, colleges also market by
projecting an image. Inaccuracies occurring through a school's im-
age marketing, so long as it is not grossly misleading, is probably best
characterized as nonactionable puffery," those exaggerations and
vague superlatives that contract law has long tolerated. This passage
from a University of Phoenix brochure is a good example of puffery:
"No other university in America is more dedicated to your success....
Because all our students are busy professionals, service is our priority.
You will find no long lines for registration, no need for frequent trips
to college bookstores, and no unnecessary administration."4 °
Although the statement projects an "image" of the institution, even if
inaccurate, no single statement is actionable, as each statement is
either a subjective opinion, a superlative, or a mere exaggeration, and
all of it is too vague and too general to enforce.
Legally permissible puffery aside, college administrators have
established ethical standards to govern their marketing conduct. Ad-
mission counselors govern themselves by a code of ethics that pre-
cludes false and deceptive recruiting practices and encourages
providing accurate and truthful information to applicants.4' Impor-
tantly, the code of ethics, to which many college admission counselors
ascribe, forbids commission-driven recruitment, thus avoiding the ob-
38. See id. at 1, 2.
39. See IVAN L. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW-UP: PUFFERY IN ADVERTISING AND
SELLING 17 (1975) (defining puffery as "advertising or other sales representations which
praise the item to be sold with subjective opinions, superlatives, or exaggerations, vaguely
and generally, stating no specific facts"); IVAN L. PRESTON, THE TANGLED WEB THEY WEAVE:
TRUTH, FALSITY, AND ADVERTISERS 103-05 (1994) (discussing the general concept and the
history of puffery and providing examples thereof); see alsoJEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE AD-
VERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL CONCEPT 19 (1990) (defining puffery and distin-
guishing the concept from that of unfairness).
40. Jacqueline Raphael & Sheila Tobias, Profit-Making or Profiteering? Proprietaries Target
Teacher Education, 29 CHANGE 44, 47 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX BROCHURE 1997).
41. Originally promulgated by the National Association for College Admission Coun-
seling (NACAC) to promote ethics in recruiting, a joint Code of Ethics was developed by
the NACAC, the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admission Officers,
The College Board and endorsed by the American Council on Education, the National
Association of Secondary School Principals, the National Student Association, and the
American School Counselor Association. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR COLLEGE ADMIS-
SION COUNSELING, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE (rev. 1997) [hereinafter
GOOD PRACTICE]; see also AMERICAN ASS'N OF COLLEGIATE REGISTRARS AND ADMISSIONS OF-
FICERS, 1998-99 AACRO MEMBER GUIDE, PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES AND ETHICAL STANDARDS,
at xi (prescribing a Code of Professional Practices and Standards for college registrars and
admissions officers).
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vious conflicts and the temptations associated with per capita pay-
ments. 42 Moreover, the code of ethics for admissions officers charges
them with oversight obligations for the admission and the recruitment
practices of their institution generally.43
Good practice requires that, among other things, admissions
counselors assume responsibility for all publications used to promote
and to recruit students and ensure that their institution refrains from
false and misleading advertising.44 Admissions counselors are ex-
pected to provide precise and accurate information concerning pro-
gram offerings at their institution, to give accurate information
regarding costs of attendance, and to "speak forthrightly, accurately,
and comprehensively in presenting their institutions to counseling
personnel, prospective students, and their families."45 Good practice
favors providing "comprehensive," "current and accurate," "clear" and
"precise" information, and "current and realistic" pictures and de-
scriptions of the institution to prospective students.46 In addition, ad-
missions counselors must refrain from initiating contacts and enticing
students enrolled or intending to enroll at other institutions to trans-
fer.47 In their marketing efforts, admission counselors are admon-
ished "not [to] use disparaging comparisons of secondary or
postsecondary institutions."48
Active marketing is not the only vestige of commercialism in
higher education; the typical college student is less and less character-
ized as wide-eyed and innocent and is more often regarded as a savvy
shopper.49 Many students are now nontraditional students who work
and who raise families while attending school.50 Many students no
42. See GooD PRACrICE, supra note 41, at I.A.1-2.
43. See id. at I.A.2-3.
44. See id.
45. Id. at I.A.4.
46. Id. at I.A.1-2.
47. See id. at I.A.6.
48. Id. at I.A.4.d.
49. Cf AUDLEY & DoRLAc, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that, since the late 1970s, "discimi-
nating buyers in the American marketplace [have] expected the same consideration from
educational institutions as they [have] received from others"); Martin & Moore, supra note
8, at 234 (assessing student satisfaction with the college "product" as a critical marketing
factor); Zemsky, supra note 8, at 24 (describing differing student markets including the
typical "traditional-aged students matriculating at largely residential campuses" and the
recent rise of "user-friendly institutions that stress convenience and value for students of a
variety of ages, those who increasingly mix work and learning while pursuing their degrees
one or two courses at a time").
50. The traditional 18-22 year old undergraduate students desiring a "holistic" educa-
tional experience that is preparatory in nature and includes "co-curricular activities" has
been replaced by a "new majority of part-time and intermittent learners who are older,
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longer desire a liberal education and instead have specific career
goals and desire convenience and flexibility. Today, many students
expect the school to accommodate the student's schedule and inter-
ests and not vice versa. Proprietary colleges that cater to consumer-
oriented students have influenced the market, causing many tradi-
tional schools to rethink how they sell education, treat student-
consumers, and define themselves.51
The federal government has long recognized the consumer na-
ture of education and the need for congressional oversight.52 The
Student-Right-to-Know provisions of the Higher Education Act5" evi-
dence congressional recognition that higher education is both a prod-
uct and a relationship that begs for external review. 4 Congress
imposes numerous disclosure requirements on postsecondary schools
receiving federal funds, including the requirement to provide all stu-
dents with general descriptive information and information regarding
the nature of the program, its costs and its financial aid terms,55 crime
data,56 and student-athlete consumer information.5 7 Congress specifi-
[and] frequently combine work and schooling" and colleges often market to both constitu-
encies. Zemsky, subra note 8, at 35-36.
51. In terms of efficiency and cost, it is difficult for the traditional college to compete
with the "streamlined," standardized proprietary school. These schools cater to working
students, teach specifically to licensing (minimum) requirements, do not expect and do
not fund faculty research, and use part-time faculty who have developed their expertise at
the expense of another employer. See Raphael & Tobias, supra note 40, at 46-47 (identify-
ing the University of Phoenix as an example of an institution that has been successful in
delivering a "streamlined" education).
52. The government has turned over much of the oversight function to private accred-
iting agencies by requiring institutions receiving federal funds to be accredited by federally
approved and recognized accrediting agencies. In essence, "the Secretary of Education
accredits the accreditors." SeeJeffrey C. Martin, Recent Developments Concerning Accrediting
Agencies in Postsecondary Education, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 124 (1994) (discussing
the historical and the current relationship between the federal government, private accred-
iting agencies, and higher education institutions).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (1994 & Supp. 1998). See generally WILLiAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA
A. LEE, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR STUDENT AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS § 12.3.3.3, at 542 (1997) [here-
inafter STUDENT AFAIRS] (discussing the Student-Right-to-Know Act); LAw OF HIGHER EDU-
CATION, supra note 3, § 4.15.1, at 559, § 7.4.3.3 (explaining information sharing
requirements imposed on higher education institutions by the Student-Right-to-Know Act).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 101-518, at 1-2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3363, 3363-
64 [hereinafter HousE REPORT] (commenting that "[i]n an era marked by increasing col-
lege costs and greater scrutiny of our nation's system of higher education, it is not surpris-
ing to find that parents and students are asking more 'consumer oriented' questions
before making the decision to attend a particular college or university").
55. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(A)-(F), (b), (c).
56. See id. § 1092(f) (describing the required "[d]isclosure of campus security policy
and campus crime statistics" and codifying the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act;
see also Michael C. Griffaton, Note, Forewarned is Forearmed: The Crime Awareness and Campus
Security Act of 1990 and the Future of Institutional Liability for Student Victimization, 43 CASE W.
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cally noted that parents and students are properly asking more "'con-
sumer-oriented' questions before making the decision to attend a
particular college or university"5" and so to assist and to protect stu-
dents and prospective students, federal law now compels colleges to
collect and to disclose quantitative graduation data and other infor-
mation to make sound consumer choices. 9 Congressional hearings
suggested that colleges were not providing adequate information and
student-consumers and their parents need more "outcome [ I] oriented
measures" to make informed choices "before any financial commit-
ment is made to the institution."60
Emphasizing the consumer nature of the relationship, the House
Committee commented that they "believe[d] that the reporting of
graduation rates will protect parents and students from institutions
that encourage students to enroll but fail to focus on student reten-
tion as part of providing a quality educational experience."61 More-
over, the House specifically acknowledged the special vulnerability of
students and noted that this "information is especially important for
first generation college students who have had little experience in
dealing with institutions of higher education."62 These federal report-
ing requirements demonstrate the congressional view that education
REs. L. REv. 525, 561 (1993) (explaining the disclosure requirements mandated by the
Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act).
57. See 20 U.S.C. § 2092(e) (Supp. 1998); see also Chris Truax, Why Can't the Football
Team Read?: The Student Athlete's Right-to-Know Act and the Growing Threat of Liability, 4 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. LJ. 301, 302 (1997) (explaining that the Student Athlete Right-to-Know Act
.seeks to minimize the exploitation of student athletes by requiring institutions to disclose
graduation rates for athletes to potential recruits"); STUDENT AFFAIRS, supra note 53, at 431-
32 (noting that any postsecondary institution that administers federal aid to students and
awards "[a]thletically-related student aid" is bound by the Act); LAw OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION, supra note 3, § 4.15.1, at 559 (explaining that the Student Right-to-Know Act at-
tempts to ensure that potential student-athletes will have access to data that will help them
make informed choices when selecting a university or college).
58. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 3364; see also id. (stating that "[a]s with all major
investments, families should have the opportunity to ask what sort of return they can ex-
pect from their investment").
59. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a) (1) (L) (1994). A "'prospective student' means any individ-
ual who has contacted an eligible institution requesting information concerning admission
to that institution." Id. at (a) (2); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 3364 (noting that
as amended, House Report 1454 requires institutions to provide information in areas such
as graduation rates, campus security policies, and crime statistics).
60. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 3368-69. When Congress enacted the Student
Athlete Right-to-Know Act, it initially intended to mandate graduation data disclosure for
student athletes only, but, "[f] ollowing two days of oversight hearings on student athletics
the Committee developed an interest in the need to provide rate data not only for student
athletes, but for all students who attended postsecondary institution." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3368-69.
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is a consumer product and ensure that the educational institution im-
parts some useful information to student-consumers about such mat-
ters as crime on campus, financial aid, and education costs. The
federal requirements, however, are not so comprehensive that they
police the many other important types of specific representations and
promises colleges often make to students and to applicants concern-
ing the nature of the courses, the quality of instruction, and the op-
portunities that education at their institution promises.
II. CLAIMS AGAINST COLLEGES
The deeply rooted hostility toward student claims and judicial
deference to university conduct toward students becomes increasingly
less defensible as bottom-line, commercial concerns motivate univer-
sity actions and students seek a more consumer friendly product.
Driven by economic factors or by simple poorjudgment, agents of the
university make representations and promises that are either untrue
or that the institution fails to keep.63 The following sections discuss
the current judicial posture toward student claims and suggests that
judicial reluctance to get involved in college classrooms leaves stu-
dents vulnerable and their futures uncertain. Traditional judicial def-
erence toward institutions of higher education makes courts reluctant
to apply general contract principles liberally. For example, courts re-
sist calling the educational contract unconscionable despite its adhe-
sionary qualities, courts typically do not find the student-professor or
student-institution relationships fiduciary ones despite their confiden-
tial nature, and courts are reluctant to imply broadly contractual obli-
gations for the benefit of the student.64 Courts have rejected tort
claims based on educational malpractice as a source of judicial
oversight for similar reasons.65 A few courts, however, dissatisfied
with so little a role in the adjudication of student-university
disputes, have found that contract law's implied obligations of
good faith and fair dealing66 hold tremendous potential to accord
63. Untrue factual representations give rise to claims for misrepresentation while bro-
ken promises give rise to breach of contract claims. Although substantively different, this
Article makes little of the distinction because in this instance judicial antipathy toward
either claim is similar.
64. See generally infra notes 78-142 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 143-173 and accompanying text.
66. See Burton, supra note 7, at 378-94, 403 (discussing failure to perform in good faith
as a contract breach and as being "derived from a cost perspective on the contractual
expectation interest"); Holmes, supra note 7, at 400-09, 451 (explaining good faith in con-
tract formation); Palmieri, supra note 7, at 78-120, 199-200 (noting that disclosures have
long been recognized as required in contract negotiations to the extent that one is bound
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deference, to preserve institutional autonomy, and to protect
students.
67
A. Student Claims Based Upon Specific Promises and Representations
The awkward role of contract law in adjudicating student claims
against colleges has long been noted by both courtS68 and by schol-
ars.69 Many problems exist with rigidly applying contract law. The
by good faith to disclose information material to the transaction); Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law, supra note 7, at 195, 199-207 (discussing good faith in performance
and urging that good faith should be a minimal standard); Summers, General Duty of Good
Faith, supra note 7, at 812-25, 835 (predicting that the adoption of Section 205 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts will result in an acceleration of the growth of general contract
law on good faith); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 272 (1987) (explaining
precontractual good faith and best efforts); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bar-
gain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 721-23 (1969) (analyzing conduct tantamount to bad faith).
67. Contract law has been a sufficiently flexible doctrine to adjudicate disputes among
people in very complex relationships where many expectations are unstated. It is applied,
for example, to disputes among family members, Bogigian v. Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990), in intimate relationships, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976)
(en banc), between physicians and their patients, Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183
(Mass. 1973), and in long-term, complex commercial relationships, Oglebay Norton Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1990).
68. One court explained:
[I]n light of the wide latitude and discretion afforded by the courts to educa-
tional institutions in academic matters, the University is entitled to some leeway in
modifying its programs from time to time so as to properly exercise its educa-
tional responsibility. The concept of a binding, absolute, unchangeable contract
is particularly anomalous in the context of post graduate level work.
Marquez v. University of Wash., 648 P.2d 94, 96-97 (Wash. App. 1982) (internal citations
omitted). Courts have gone as far as to say that "[e]ven to think that a university could be
found to have broken its contract when it changed the dates of classes, or the curriculum,
for reasons beyond its control, or changed teachers should startle anyone familiar with
university life." Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 713 F.2d 881, 885 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Davenport,
supra note 24, at 215-16 (discussing Cuesnongle v. Ramos and noting how courts have agreed
that universities have distinct qualities, which requires that they have great latitude in man-
agement decisions). Davenport attributed judicial resistance to holding colleges to the
representations of their catalogs as deference and indulgence of flexibility as based on the
"educational responsibility and expertise" theory and the "notion that . . . flexibility will
enhance the quality of education." Id.
69. See LAw oF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, § 4.1.3, at 373-77 (exploring the vari-
ous ways in which contract theory is implicated by the student-university relationship); Dav-
enport, supra note 24, at 211 (noting that many rules of contract interpretation have been
applied to college catalogs and discussing courts' general reluctance to recognize a college
catalog as a contract of adhesion); Victoria J. Dodd, The Non-Contractual Nature of the Stu-
dent-University Contractual Relationship, 33 U. KAN. L. REv. 701, 709-12 (1985) (discussing the
application of contract theory to student-university cases); Elizabeth L. Grossi & Terry D.
Edwards, Student Misconduct: Historical Trends in Legislative and Judicial Decision-Making in
American Universities, 23 J.C. & U.L. 829, 839-52 (1997) (acknowledging that the student-
university relationship, now shaped by constitutional and contractual theories, is fraught
with complexities and ambiguities); Jennings, supra note 25, at 198-202 (discussing the
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complex relationship between the student and the university is largely
implied rather than explicitly stated, thus making it difficult for courts
to determine the contractual terms of the apparent "contract.""v The
terms expressed in the college catalog, if one is to view the catalog as
the principle source of contractual terms at all, are usually subject to a
one-sided and broad disclaimer of liability and reservation of rights
that confounds courts. 1  Moreover, pure contract law presumes
equality among the parties, or else tends to give an advantage to the
weaker.7 2 Yet, courts typically are solicitous of the educational institu-
reluctance of courts to overturn decisions made by educators when the dispute involves
strictly academic relationships); Virginia Davis Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a
More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8 J.C. & U.L. 141, 145-48 (1980)
(discussing the application of academic abstention to student-university cases); Douglas R.
Richmond, Students' Right to Counsel in University Disciplinary Proceedings, 15 J.C. & U.L. 289,
290-92 (1989) (exploring the difficulties in giving a legal definition to the student-
university relationship); Thomas A. Schweitzer, "Academic Challenge" Cases: Should Judicial
Review Extend to Academic Evaluations of Students, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 267, 288-96, 362 (1992)
(noting the need for judicial deference in the student-university relationship but advocat-
ing that arbitrary and capricious departures from institutional process and standards con-
stitute a breach of contract); Comment, Common Law Rights for Private University Students
Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 142-44 (1974) (discussing the basic ratio-
nales behind the law of property and concluding that they provide a firm foundation for
applying protections to the student-university relationship); Comment, Private Government
on the Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1377 (1963) (sug-
gesting more effective alternatives to the traditional contract analysis for use in judicial
review of student expulsions); Developments in the Law, Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV.
1045, 1146-47 (1968) [hereinafter Academic Freedom] (noting that "contract theory-as it
has heretofore been applied-unduly favors the institution and has been of limited effec-
tiveness in conferring rights upon students"); Robert Faulkner, Note, Judicial Deference to
University Decisions Not to Grant Degrees, Certificates, and Credit-the Fiduciary Alternative, 40
SYRAcusE L. REV. 837, 853-54 (1989) (noting the unwillingness of the judiciary to apply any
contract principle evenhandedly in the student-university context); Brian Jackson, Note,
The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Pnposal for Reform, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 1135, 1151-55 (1991) (noting that courts "have avoided applying ordinary commer-
cial doctrine" to the student-university relationship and have instead applied "exception-
ally harsh standards to student litigants" and maintaining that "the courts have yet to
explain why this justifies a unique and peculiarly harsh application of contract law").
70. See Peretti v. Montana, 464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979) (noting that because
a formal contract is rarely prepared between the student and the university, "the general
nature and terms of the agreement" are considered to be implied), rev'd on other grounds,
661 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981); Marquez, 648 P.2d at 96 (adopting the view that the nature of
the student-university agreement is implied).
71. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (surveying cases in which courts con-
cluded that colleges acted within the authority and guidelines expressed in the disclaimers
of the catalogs).
72. Cf ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1, at 3 (1952) (stating that "[i]t
cannot truthfully be said that the law operates uniformly with respect to the promises of
the rich and the poor, the employer and the employee" and maintaining that "U]udges as
well as juries moderate the operation of the law in favor of the poor as against the rich").
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tion's societal value and the desirability of its own autonomy.73
Courts, therefore, reject characterizing the institution or its employ-
ees as fiduciaries despite the trust and the confidence placed in
them.74 Thisjudicial deference is not limited to academic matters but
also extends to the school's business judgments.75
Yet, despite the general judicial reluctance to police the bargain
between the student and the university,76 no one can deny that the
university-student relationship is one filled with promises and repre-
sentations by the institution and by student expectations.77 The next
section explores the judicially imposed marginalization of contract
law.
1. The University-Student Contract Is Not Unconscionable. -Despite
the obvious adhesionary aspects of the student-university contract, 78
73. Cf supra note 68.
74. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (citing cases that found no fiduciary
relationship to exist between the college and the students).
75. See LAw OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, § 3.4.1, at 299 (commenting that "aca-
demic freedom refers not only to the prerogatives of faculty members and students but
also to the prerogatives of institutions"); see also Beh, supra note 5, at 179-80 (discussing the
courts' struggle to strike a balance between a desire to defer to the university's decision-
making authority and a desire to protect legitimate student interests); Ray, supra note 34,
at 180 (urging courts to reexamine their notion of university autonomy).
76. See Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (ac-
knowledging courts' general reluctance to oversee school operations but noting approval
for breach of contract claims where a school "fail[s] to provide specifically promised edu-
cational services" (citing CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1994))); see also
Davenport, supra note 24, at 215 (recognizing courts' tendency to interpret college cata-
logs in such a manner as to accord universities flexibility that would not otherwise be ex-
tended to parties in a normal contract); Jennings, supra note 24, at 200 (noting that where
a catalog provision is vague or entirely missing, "courts are likely to uphold the college
procedure, so long as it is not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion").
77. Oral representations that conflict with written standards sometimes pose particular
analytical problems, including whether the employee had authority to bind the institution.
See Ottgen v. Clover Park Technical College, 928 P.2d 1119, 1121-22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting the tensions between oral representations and written standards and stating that
there is no legal authority for the notion that "a contract between students and a school
can be created by oral representations of a teacher"); Mangla v. Brown Univ., 135 F.3d 80,
83 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing the problems raised by statements made by faculty when they
conflict with the university's printed materials). On the other hand, oral representations
may be the basis of equitable and of promissory estoppel claims. See Davenport, supra note
24, at 224 (noting that in "two New York cases, the doctrine of equitable estoppel was
applied where a degree was denied even though the plaintiff relied on oral representations
of university officials in conflict with catalog provisions" (citing Healy v. Larson, 323
N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Blank v. Board of Higher Educ., 273 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct.
1966))).
78. Adhesionary contracts are not necessarily unconscionable especially if the terms
are fair; however, the lack of meaningful choice and unequal bargaining power, which
erode the freedom of contract, give unfair provisions within a contract heightened vulnera-
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including those one-sided, take-it-or-leave-it express terms in the cata-
log as well as the general vulnerability of students,79 courts do not
generally find that the contract between the student and the institu-
tion is unconscionable."0 Successful claims of unconscionability are
usually found only in proprietary trade school cases."s
Curiously, courts seldom consider the youthful immaturity, eco-
nomic status, or lack of education of students except in the proprie-
tary school cases."2 Quite the opposite, at least one court implied an
bility to judicial intervention. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148
(Ind. 1971) (concluding that where a party can show that a contract is unconscionable due
to a vast imbalance of bargaining power on behalf of the stronger party, unbeknownst to a
lesser party, the contract will not be enforceable for public policy reasons); JOHN D.
CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRAc-rs § 9.43 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing
unequal bargaining power between contracting parties in relation to unconscionability
and adhesion contracts).
79. Students are often inexperienced in contractual matters. They are certainly less
educated than the university administrators with whom they deal and are often poor-
many are borrowing money to finance their education-and immature.
80. See Eisele v. Ayers, 381 N.E.2d 21, 24, 26 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that North-
western's tuition increase of 57.6%, which was seven times higher than any previous in-
crease, was not unconscionable where it was pursuant to a catalog provision allowing
increases without notice and when such increase is instituted by financial necessity); Presi-
dent and Bd. of Trustees v. Smith, No. 98CA11, 1999 WL 51799, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
1, 1999) (holding that a term in a medical school contract requiring five years of practice
in Ohio in exchange for a more favorable admission review is not unconscionable); see also
Davenport, supra note 24, at 212-13 (noting courts' reluctance to apply the doctrine of
unconscionability in the student-university relationship). Additionally, a lower court found
the tuition refund policies at Pace University to be unconscionable under the circum-
stances, but the ruling was reversed on appeal. See Andre v. Pace Univ., 618 N.Y.S.2d 975,
982-83 (City Court 1994), rev'd, 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. 1996). See generally Dodd, supra
note 69, at 714-18 (discussing adhesion contracts and arguing that the "student-university
contractual relationship" is an example of an adhesion contract); Jackson, supra note 69, at
1152 (stating that "[ailmost without exception, courts apply exceptionally harsh standards
to student litigants").
One author has noted, "[a] lthough it is .. .possible to create and preserve student
rights by appealing to the principles of contracts of adhesion, the contract theory seems to
misrepresent the intentions of the parties involved." Academic Freedom, supra note 69, at
1147.
81. See Lawless v. Ennis, 415 P.2d 465, 470 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (remanding for factual
determination whether a dance lesson contract was unconscionable); James v. SCS Bus. &
Technical Inst., 1992 WL 465670, at *11, withdrawn, 595 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Nov.
26, 1992) (holding tuition reimbursement terms of proprietary vocational school were un-
conscionable); Albert Merrill Sch. v. Godoy, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378, 384 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (finding
that terms of tuition refund of proprietary vocational school were unconscionable, espe-
cially in light of the student's education and language ability and in light of consumer
protection interests of the state in regulating such schools); see also LAW OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION, supra note 3, § 4.1.3, at 376 (discussing the limited instances in which courts have
found a student-university contract unconscionable).
82. See supra note 81; cf Moy v. Adelphi Inst., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 696, 706 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (finding fraud in recruiting "welfare and public assistance recipients" into a voca-
tional program).
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equality of sophistication by commenting that in ruling against a stu-
dent the "plaintiff was not an unsophisticated teenager at the time
and admitted that she was familiar with university 'ropes."'" 3 Courts
generally do not object to the abbreviated withdrawal periods or to
partial refund schedules that schools employ, despite the obvious diffi-
culties students have in judging the suitability of a course at the time
of enrollment.8 4
2. Catalog Disclaimers and Reservations of Rights. -Although "a
school's catalog constitutes a written contract between the educational
institution and the patron,"85 the typical catalog contains broad lan-
guage disclaiming liability and reserving the institution's right to
change the contract.8 6 If interpreted literally, then despite the pages
and pages of pictures, descriptions and promises, despite the personal
contacts and inducements made, the school has promised nothing to
the student, not even that it will continue as an educational institution
during the student's term of enrollment.8 7
83. Hershman v. University of Toledo, 519 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1987).
84. See generally Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Absence From or Inability to Attend School or
College as Affecting Liability For or Right to Recover Payments for Tuition or Board, 20 A.L.R.4th
303, 306 (1981) (noting that many courts have taken the position that where an educa-
tional institution provides instruction and a student or a parent agrees to pay a definite
amount the entire contract price is payable regardless of whether the student attended or
withdrew once classes began).
85. Eiland v. Wolf, 764 S.W.2d 827, 837 (Tex. App. 1989) (quoting University of Tex.
Health Science Ctr. v. Babb, 646 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex. App. 1982)).
86. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the broad assertions and
reservations often found in college catalogs).
87. While courts and scholars rely on contract law to define the relationship, not all
agree on the source of the contractual terms. Some courts rely principally on implied
terms and less on the written catalog. See Peretti v. Montana, 464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D.
Mont. 1979) (stating that because "a formal contract is rarely prepared [in the student-
university context,] the general terms of the agreement are usually implied"), rev'd on other
grounds, 661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1981); Marquez v. University of Wash., 648 P.2d 94, 96
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (citing the Peretti decision to find an implied agreement between
the student and the university).
Other courts rely heavily on the catalog and its disclaimers, if any. See Beukas v. Board
of Trustees, 605 A.2d 708, 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (approving the closure of a
dental school and noting that "[e ] ven if we assume for analytic purposes, that the various
University bulletins constituted an enforceable contract, that contract would include the
reservation of rights"); Eiland, 764 S.W.2d at 838 (relying on catalog disclaimers and decid-
ing that university officials acted within the authority granted to them and the guidelines
provided in the school catalog).
Oral promises and representations throughout the student-university relationship are
often regarded as contractual in nature. See Ho v. University of Tex., 984 S.W.2d 672, 691
(Tex. App. 1998) (discussing the implications of oral representations and silence and not-
ing that "[a] duty to speak may arise when a fiduciary relationship exists between the par-
ties, or when a party makes a material representation relied upon by the other party that
he later finds out to be untrue and fails to reveal this change in events" (internal citations
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The catalog disclaimer's effect on the university-student relation-
ship has an inconsistent meaning among courts."" Some courts view
the implied contract between students and the university as much
broader than the provisions of the catalog and regard the express dis-
claimer within the catalog as ineffective in the broader context of the
relationship. 9 Other courts have found that the disclaimer is a valid
waiver of contractual liability for representations made to students
and for program modifications after enrollment.9 ° Still others inter-
pret disclaimers within catalogs as valid only to the extent the changes
to and terminations of the educational programs are instituted in
good faith and are not arbitrary.9 1
3. The University and its Faculty are Not Fiduciaries. -Even though
there is an increasing tendency for courts to create fiduciary duties in
moral, social, domestic, or in purely personal relationships where one
party needs additional protection,92 students are out of luck.93 Were
omitted)). Commentators are equally divided as to the contractual effect of catalogs, per-
sonal written and oral contacts, and other implied terms. See generally Kevin P. McJessy,
Comment, Contract Law: A Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability Claims, 89 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1768, 1793 n.115 (1995) (discussing the varying views among scholars).
88. See Davenport, supra note 24, at 221 (noting that the legal effect given to a catalog's
disclaimer is "less than clear"); see also Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary: Litigation Involv-
ing Higher Education Employee and Student Handbooks, 109 WEST'S ED. L. REP. 1031, 1046
(1996) (discussing college catalog ambiguities due to language that is subject to more than
one interpretation and noting the "number of legal strategies" that courts use "to clarify
contract interpretation").
89. See Craig v. Forest Inst., 713 So. 2d 967, 969, 973-76 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding
that a broad disclaimer in a catalog did not permit abrupt program closure); Aase v. South
Dakota, 400 N.W.2d 269, 277 (S.D. 1986) (Sabers, J., dissenting) (rejecting a disclaimer as
necessarily binding).
90. See Beukas, 605 A.2d at 708-09 (deciding that payment of tuition constitutes a stu-
dent's acceptance of the university's reservation of rights paragraph in the catalog); Tobias
v. University of Tex., 824 S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex. App. 1991) (holding that a catalog's dis-
claimer of contractual liability was valid); Eiland, 764 S.W.2d at 838 (upholding language in
a catalog disclaiming contractual liability).
91. See Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1369 (D.C. 1977) (HarrisJ.,
concurring) (supporting a tuition increase based on a catalog reservation of rights because
the tuition increases were implemented in good faith); Eisele v. Ayers, 381 N.E.2d 21, 25-27
(Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a seven-fold tuition increase was permissible when a
catalog provided for tuition increases without notice so long as the increase is not insti-
tuted in bad faith); Gamble v. University Sys., 610 A.2d 357, 363 (N.H. 1992) (holding that
a reservation of rights clause permitted a tuition increase after the registration deadline
because the university had a "fiscal emergency" and forewarned most of its students and
failure to notify some of the students "was an oversight, rather than an act of bad faith");
Lesure v. State, No. 89-347-I1, 1990 WL 64533, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., May 18, 1990) (find-
ing that a disclaimer of contractual liability and of reservation of rights does not avoid
liability for misrepresentation regarding accreditation).
92. There is an increasing tendency to find fiduciary relationships outside of the edu-
cational context:
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the relationship between the university and the student a fiduciary
one, then there would be "[a] heavier burden of disclosure ... with
respect to matters within the fiduciary relation."94 Courts, however,
are surprisingly insensitive to the relationship that exists between the
inexperienced students and the faculty or the advisors. Courts gener-
ally regard the "normal student-teacher relationship" involving "usual
job duties of teaching, supervising, advising and evaluating" as insuffi-
cient to establish an informal fiduciary relationship based on trust and
reliance.95 In light of the tremendous judicial deference to the self-
governance of universities and to their academic freedoms, and the
vulnerability of students, perhaps the glib rejection of a fiduciary sta-
tus is not particularly grounded in law. 6
[Fiduciary relationships] include the relationship between an employer and em-
ployee, brothers and sisters, husband and wife, persons engaged to be married,
children and parents, attorney and client, officers of the corporation and stock-
holders, joint purchasers, joint owners selling jointly owned property, partners,
joint venturers, physician and patient, priest and parishioner, rabbi and congre-
gation, principal and agent, and trustee and cestui que trust .... At least two
courts have even found that close friends stand in such a relationship of trust and
confidence as to require full disclosure of material facts.
Palmieri, supra note 7, at 127-28 (footnotes omitted).
93. See Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506 (Ct. App. 1972) (find-
ing that facts giving rise to a fiduciary duty had not been pleaded and that "[t]he mere
placing of trust in another person does not create a fiduciary relationship"); Shapiro v.
Butterfield, 921 S.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that no fiduciary rela-
tionship between faculty advisor and student existed); Nigro v. Research College of Nurs-
ing, 876 S.W.2d 681, 686-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that there is no fiduciary
relationship between an educational institution and its applicants); President and Bd. of
Trustees v. Smith, 1999 WL 51799, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1999) (finding that there
was no support for the existence of a "fiduciary relationship between an educational insti-
tution and a prospective student"); Ho v. University of Tex., 984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex.
App. 1998) (finding, as a matter of law, that no fiduciary duty between student and faculty
member/advisor existed); Abrams v. Mary Washington College, 1994 WL 1031166, at *4
(Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1994) (finding no basis in common law for creating a fiduciary rela-
tionship between senior college officials and students). But see Faulkner, supra note 69, at
866 (concluding that "fiduciary theory more realistically depicts the relation between indi-
vidual and institution" than does contract theory). See generally Michael J. Polelle, Who's On
First, and What's a Professional?, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 205, 224-29 (1999) (discussing fiduciary
ethics).
94. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.26(c), at 344 (1990).
95. See Ho, 984 S.W.2d at 693; see also Maas v. Corporation of Gonzaga Univ., 618 P.2d
106, 108 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting a student's claim that confidential or fiduciary
relationship arose "since the university is in a better position to know of the student's
probable success than is the student").
96. See Polelle, supra note 93, at 213 (concluding that "the decision to disallow a tort
action for educational malpractice is not based on a principled definition of professional-
ism or the lack of it but, rather, on pragmatic policy grounds").
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4. Claims Based On Specific and Objective Promises and Representa-
tions.-Even though courts do not regard the university-student con-
tract as adhesionary, or the relationship as fiduciary, students are
occasionally permitted to press their claims when the student can al-
lege that the university made very specific and objectively verifiable
promises or representations that induced his or her enrollment.9
7
This section explores contract claims based on specific representa-
tions and promises.
Students sometimes allege that the college misrepresented cer-
tain specific characteristics of the program,98 that officials gave false
assurances of student ability to succeed or to find employment, 99 that
the institution failed to follow or changed stated procedures or pre-
97. In misrepresentation cases, there must be reliance upon the statements made. See
Nigro, 876 S.W.2d at 687 (holding that appellants failed to establish the reliance element of
fraud); Linson v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., No. Civ. A. 95-3681, 1996 WL 4795332, at *11
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996) (finding that because the plaintiff did not rely on statements
made in the college catalog his fraud claim was without merit).
98. See Idrees v. American Univ., 546 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing
allegations that the college falsely represented that it had a library with periodicals, books,
and visual aids); CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (re-
garding the argument that "CenCor's catalog constituted express terms and conditions of a
contract and that CenCor breached the contract by failing to provide specific educational
services promised therein"); Nigro, 876 S.W.2d at 687 (concluding that there was no fraud
absent a showing that nurses had relied on statements made by the nursing college in
relation to anticipated accreditation); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v.Jacobsen, 148 A.2d 63,
67 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1959) (holding that quotations from Columbia University's
catalog as to the nature of courses in the curricula did not constitute a false representa-
tion); Dizick v. Umpqua Community College, 599 P.2d 444, 445 (Or. 1979) (en banc)
(holding that the college made fraudulent misrepresentations when representatives of the
college told a student that he could receive advanced welding training); Lesure v. State,
No. 89-347-Il, 1990 WL 64533, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 1990) (finding that the uni-
versity made a misrepresentation in its catalog about the certification of the program in
Respiratory Therapy).
99. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing allega-
tions that Creighton University had a duty to "recruit and enroll only those students rea-
sonably qualified and able to academically perform" and that duty was breached when
Creighton failed to inform the appellant that he was unprepared for the academic rigors of
the university (internal quotation marks omitted)); Blane v. Alabama Commercial College,
Inc., 585 So. 2d 866, 868 (Ala. 1991) (finding that recovery under a breach of contract or
fraud claim is unavailable when a college merely promised that the student would have the
minimum skills necessary for ajob in a particular field); Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d
777, 781 (App. Term 1996) (regarding claims that a representative of the college assured
students that "their background was sufficient to enter the graduate program and they
would have no problems with the course"); Abraham v. New York Univ. College of Den-
tistry, 593 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 1993) (concluding that a student could not base a
fraud or a breach of contract claim against the university on the theory that the university
allegedly represented that graduation would qualify her to take licensing exams in every
state); York v. Branell College, No. 02A1993-9209-CV-00257, 1993 WL 484203, at *5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1993) (discussing claims that the school misrepresented the possible
employment opportunities that would be available upon graduation).
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scribed requirements, 00 or that the school failed to deliver the pro-
gram as it specifically promised.' Contract claims that attack the
general quality of instruction and are not based on specific breaches
that are objectively verifiable are more likely to fail.'0 2
When college personnel make concrete and easily verifiable rep-
resentations that do not intrude too extensively into the academic
realm, courts shed their deferential view. ° 3 For example, when per-
100. See Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 201 (1st Cir. 1977) (alleging that
the college's refusal to allow a student to continue her studies after receiving a failing
grade constituted breach of contract); Thornton v. Harvard Univ., 2 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (D.
Mass. 1998) (concluding that Harvard's financial aid guidelines explicitly reserved Harvard
University's right to change the terms of various programs in order to make the best use of
funds); Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ill. 1977) (alleging that the
school failed to evaluate a student's application according to academic criteria presented
in the school's bulletin); Keles v. New York Univ., No. 91 CIV. 7457, 1994 WL 119525, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994) (alleging that the college breached an implied contract by denying
the plaintiff the right to retake qualifying examinations an indefinite number of times).
101. See Moy v. Adelphi Inst., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 696, 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (alleging that
the school failed to provide the promised vocational training); Cooper v. Peterson, 626
N.Y.S.2d 432, 432-33 (1995) (regarding claims of misrepresentation and fraud against the
school that sought to eliminate varsity wrestling prior to graduation); Marquez v. University
of Wash., 648 P.2d 94, 96-97 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing a breach of contract claim
for failure to provide academic aid and noting that universities are "entitled to some lee-
way in modifying . . . programs from time to time").
102. The promises can be obviously vague, unenforceable, and illusory:
I have really only one charge against Columbia: that it does not teach Wisdom as
it claims to do. From this charge ensues an endless number of charges, of which I
have selected fifty at random. I am prepared to show that each of these fifty
claims in turn is false, though the central issue is that of Columbia's pretense of
teaching Wisdom.
Jacobsen, 148 A.2d at 66; see also id. (holding that quotations from Columbia University's
catalogs and brochures and inscriptions over its buildings and statements of its officers
setting forth its goals and desires including factual statements as to the nature of its courses
do not constitute false representations); Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111,
119-20 (Conn. 1996) (holding that general claims about quality are not actionable); Sirohi
v. Lee, 634 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that a claim against Columbia
University alleging breach of "atmosphere conducive to academic pursuits" promised and
represented was not actionable); Lawrence v. Lorain County Community College, 713
N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a student's claim that a college pro-
vided a "substandard education, guidance and supervision" was a nonactionable educa-
tional malpractice claim in the guise of a contract claim).
103. The deference has its roots, in part, in academic freedom. Academic decisions
touching on academic freedom concepts are accorded tremendous deference by courts.
See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978) (warning against "judicial intru-
sion into academic decisionmaking" (footnote omitted)); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (reversing a professor's criminal contempt conviction for refusal to
answer a legislative committee and finding that "there unquestionably was an invasion of
petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression-areas in
which government should be extremely reticent to tread"); Haberle v. University of Ala.,
803 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11 th Cir. 1986) (noting that "in the absence of an improper motive,
an academic dismissal must be 'such a substantial departure from accepted academic
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sonnel misrepresent the type and quality of equipment and facilities
available in recruiting students, the claim of misrepresentation is po-
tentially viable.' °4 When schools misrepresent the accreditation status
of the school, the employability of students with a degree, or fail to
deliver the educational program promised, the claims may succeed
when sufficiently specific. 10 5
On the other hand, vague promises regarding the student's fu-
ture advantage in the job market or representations that the school
teaches valuable skills are generally not actionable!0 6 Similarly, fail-
norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment'" (quoting
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985))); Wirsing v. Board of Regents, 739
F. Supp. 551, 553 (D. Colo. 1990) (recognizing that "[t]he 'four essential freedoms' of the
university are to determine for itself on academic grounds: 1) who may teach; 2) what may
be taught; 3) how it shall be taught; and 4) who may be admitted to study" (citing Sweezy,
354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Arizona Bd. of Regents v. Wilson, 539 P.2d
943, 946 (Ariz. 1975) (stating that a university's admissions decision provides "a prime
example of when a court should not interfere in the academic program of a university").
See generally LAw OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, § 3.7 (describing faculty academic
freedom); Olivas, supra note 10, at 1857 (discussing academic freedom and noting increas-
ing "legal involvement in classroom affairs"); Ray, supra note 34, at 183-85 (explaining
judicial deference to academic freedom); Schweitzer, supra note 69, at 362 (noting the
need for judicial deference but discussing instances where arbitrary and capricious depar-
tures from the institutional process and from standards would constitute a breach of
contract).
104. See CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (reversing
the trial court ruling in favor of the school and holding that students have a cause of action
where they allege that a school represented in their catalog that students would train on
"up-to-date equipment and instruments" and work under "qualified faculty"); Dizick v.
Umpqua Community College, 599 P.2d 444, 449 (Ore. 1979) (en banc) (reinstating a dam-
ages award to a student where a community college falsely represented the type of equip-
ment that would be available to him in welding classes); Lesure v. State, No. 89-347-II, 1990
WL 64533, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 1990) (finding liability where the university
misrepresented that the respiratory therapy school was accredited); American Commercial
Colleges, Inc. v. Davis, 821 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex. App. 1991) (finding a breach where a
"catalogue promised such things as qualified teachers, modern equipment, a low teacher
to student ratio, and excellent training aids" but that the "college actually provided one
unqualified teacher in a room with seating for 42 students, all taking different level
courses, with only two 10-key adding machines" and the "only training aid was an unused
overhead projector").
105. See Behrend v. State, 379 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (finding in favor of
students where the college lost accreditation for its school of architecture); York, 1993 WL
484203, at *1 (affirming a decision against a "private, for-profit, business and technical
[trade] school[ ]" where training received made students no more employable in the med-
ical profession than they would have been without the training); Delta Sch. of Commerce,
Inc. v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Ark. 1992) (affirming a finding of fraud where the
school promised a "position would be waiting for her after graduation"); Beckett v. Com-
puter Career Inst., 852 P.2d 840, 844 (Or. App. 1993) (affirming a finding of liability
under consumer protection laws for misrepresenting job placement rates).
106. See, e.g., Blane v. Alabama Commercial College, Inc., 585 So. 2d 866, 868 (Ala.
1991) (holding no recovery under contract theory where the college "promised to provide
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ing to disclose that marginal applicants may fail is not actionable °7
nor is admitting students who run a risk of failure.' An unexpressed
but pronounced for-profit/non-profit distinction seems to exist when
courts characterize the claims; courts are more sympathetic to student
claims when the educational enterprise is proprietary.10 9
Institutions are vulnerable to student claims when the student al-
leges that the institution made specific and objectively determinable
promises or representations. A recent case involving specific broken
commitments, Guckenberger v. Boston University, l0 is instructive. In
Guckenberger, three disabled students alleged that Boston University
broke specific promises that the school had made during recruitment
to accommodate the students' disabilities.111 Students with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder filed suit against Boston University alleg-
ing violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act,' 1 2 the Rehabilita-
tion Act 1 3 and also asserting breach of contract and promissory
estoppel." 4 Their breach of contract claim alleged that Boston Uni-
versity had provided printed promotional materials to the students
[the student] . .. with minimum clerical skills to compete in jobs in the clerical field" but
did not "guarantee[ ] . . . ajob or [give] . . . assurance that she would find a job").
107. See, e.g., Maas v. Corporation of Gonzaga Univ., 618 P.2d 106, 109-10 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980) (finding that the decision to award a degree is "within the academic sphere"
and, as such "courts should abstain from interference").
108. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a claim of
"negligent admission"); Maas, 618 P.2d at 109 (concluding that there is "no duty on the
part of the university to warn applicants of prospective failure").
109. See Tolman, 868 P.2d at 399 (involving a claim against "a Delaware corporation
transacting business in Colorado as Colorado College of Medical and Dental Careers" and
upholding a breach of contract claim); Delta Sch. of Commerce, Inc. v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d
203, 207-08 (Ark. 1992) (holding that students were not required to exhaust federal ad-
ministrative remedies against the Delta School of Commerce, a corporation, as those reme-
dies were inadequate); Albert Merrill Sch. v. Godoy, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382-84 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1974) (holding that the contract requiring the defendant to pay a certain tuition
and fees for a course offered by the plaintiff school was unconscionable); Lawless v. Ennis,
415 P.2d 465, 470 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (finding genuine issues of material fact such that
summary judgment for the plaintiff who brought the action for rescission of a dancing
lesson contract should not have been granted).
110. 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997).
111. Id. at 118. This case has some notoriety. The then president of Boston University
had publicly condemned the increasing trend of making educational accommodations,
claiming that these accommodations supported lazy students. See id. In the infamous
somnolent Samantha" speech, he fabricated the story of a lazy student claiming learning
disabilities. See id.; see also Coddington v. Adelphi Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218-19
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff-student had sufficiently pled a breach of con-
tract claim based on promises within published materials and oral representations of insti-
tution that it would accommodate disabled students with untimed tests and notetakers).
112. See Guckenberger, 974 F. Supp. at 114; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1210 (1996).
113. See Guckenberger, 974 F. Supp. at 114; 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1997).
114. See Guckenberger, 974 F. Supp. at 150.
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touting a "highly trained staff," and offering "reasonable accommoda-
tions in testing and coursework" and that the college breached spe-
cific promises made to the students during recruitment. 115 The court
summarized the specific promises made and broken:
BU made specific promises to these three individual students
and... BU reneged on its representations. Rather than the
promised course substitution for her foreign language obli-
gation, BU required LaBrecque to take Swahili, a language
that had both an oral and written component. Greeley la-
bored from August until December of his freshman year
without LDSS support and, just prior to finals, he was in-
formed that his request for exam accommodations had been
denied because of inadequate documentation. When Guck-
enberger sought to submit her learning disabilities special-
ist's evaluations so that she could get exam accommodations
during her second year of law school, she was told that she
would have to be completely retested for dyslexia within the
three weeks prior to exams.11 6
As to the students' contract claims based upon the promises
within the promotional materials, the court made no finding as to
whether the promises were sufficiently specific to constitute an en-
forceable contract. Instead, the court noted that there was no evi-
dence of offer, acceptance, or reliance because the materials were
likely received after the students had decided to enroll. 1 7 The court
concluded, however, that the personal promises made in letters and
orally by employees at the college constituted enforceable contractual
agreements which the college breached." 8 Guckenbergeris representa-
tive of a fair number of cases.. 9 where courts find colleges making
115. Id. at 151.
116. Id. at 152.
117. See id. at 151. The court noted that only one of the plaintiffs, Greeley, did in fact
rely on the brochure, but failed to resolve or to distinguish this reliance. See id.
118. See id. at 152. The court awarded money damages and ordered the school to "cease
and desist implementing its current policy" toward students with learning disabilities. d. at
154. The court also ordered Boston University to review its academic policy on allowing
foreign language substitutions. See id. at 154-55. In subsequent proceedings under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the court upheld Boston University's decision against al-
lowing course substitutions. See Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp. 82, 87-90 (D.
Mass. 1997). While not decided under contract law, the decision reflects judicial reluc-
tance generally not to substitute its own standards for that of the institution's.
119. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1992) (ruling that a
student stated breach of contract claim based on promises to provide "meaningful" access
to academic programs); Coddington v. Adelphi Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218-20 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (ruling that students stated a breach of contract claim based on promotional materi-
als and on oral representations concerning accommodations provided to disabled stu-
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specific and concrete commitments to students that have created con-
tractual liability.12
0
Ross v. Creighton University12' is probably the most notable recent
case to extend breach of contract claims to less specific promises. In
this case, basketball player and student, Kevin Ross, filed suit against
Creighton University alleging educational malpractice and breach of
contract.' 22 Creighton recruited Ross and awarded him an athletic
scholarship although his academic record did not comport with
Creighton's normal standards; Ross tested in the "bottom fifth percen-
tile of college-bound seniors" while "average freshman admitted to
Creighton with him scored in the upper twenty-seven percent. "123
Ross played for Creighton for four years, during which time he main-
tained a "D" average "in courses such as Marksmanship and Theory of
Basketball."' 24 Upon leaving Creighton after his athletic eligibility
ended (and thirty-two credits shy of his graduation requirements),
Ross read at a seventh grade level and had the language skills of a
fourth grader.125 Creighton attempted to assist Ross by providing re-
medial education at a private grade school, which Ross attended with
young children. 126 Ross, however, attempted but never finished col-
lege elsewhere and finally suffered a "major depressive episode."'' 27
dents); Idrees v. American Univ., 546 F. Supp. 1342, 1348-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that
the college misrepresented the quality of facilities and its credentials in its bulletin);
CenCor v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 399-400 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (finding that the college
failed to meet promises in its catalog concerning the quality of equipment and the experi-
ence of the instructors); Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 474 n.3 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999) (ruling that the students stated a claim based on the failure to deliver on spe-
cific promises concerning the type of training that students would receive); Behrend v.
State, 379 N.E.2d 617, 619-21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the students stated a
cause of action where the school breached its promise of reestablishing accreditation);
Dizick v. Umpqua Community College, 599 P.2d 444,445-47 (Or. 1979) (en banc) (finding
that the oral assurances made concerning the program quality were fraudulent).
120. Kaplin and Lee warned administrators:
Language suggestive of a commitment (or promise) to students should be used
only when the institution is prepared to live up to the commitment. Limitations
on the institution's commitments should be clearly noted where possible. Admin-
istrators should consider the adoption of an official policy, perhaps even a "code
of good practice," on fair dealing with students.
LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, § 4.2.1, at 376-77 (citation omitted).
121. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
122. Id. at 410.
123. Id. at 411.
124. See id. at 412.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id.
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Ross filed suit asserting claims sounding in contract and in
tort. 2 ' The lower court dismissed all counts for failure to state a
claim.' 29 Ross's contract claim alleged that Creighton promised Ross
a "meaningful college education" and that it:
breached this contract by failing to provide Mr. Ross ade-
quate tutoring; by not requiring Mr. Ross to attend tutoring
sessions; by not allowing him to "red-shirt," that is, to forego
a year of basketball, in order to work on academics; and by
failing to afford Mr. Ross a reasonable opportunity to take
advantage of tutoring services. 130
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment in favor of Creighton as to the educational mal-
practice claims, noting the "overwhelming majority of states that have
considered this type of claim have rejected it."' 3 ' The court identified
a variety of policy reasons to justify rejection of the tort claim includ-
ing the inability to establish a uniform and satisfactory standard of
care, the uncertainty of the cause and nature of damages, 1 2 and the
risk of overburdening schools with many lawsuits.' 33 Finally, the court
cited a reluctance to permit a cause of action that "threatens to em-
broil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day operations of
schools."'3 4 For similar policy reasons, the court rejected a "negligent
admission" claim as well.' 35
The court viewed the contract claims quite differently than the
malpractice claims, although noting the danger it faced in distinguish-
ing between them. The court explained that contract duties cannot
be "arbitrarily disregarded and may be judicially enforced" but that "a
decision of the school authorities relating to the academic qualifica-
128. See id.
129. See id. at 412-13.
130. Id. at 412.
131. Id. at 414 (footnote omitted); see infra notes 143-173 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing judicial rejection of educational malpractice claims).
132. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 414 (citing Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431 N.Y.S.2d
246, 246-47 (App. Term 1980) (per curiam)). The court explained that "[f]actors such as
the student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience and home environment
may all play an essential and immeasurable role in learning" and therefore, it would be a
"practical impossibility [to] prov[e] that the alleged malpractice of the teacher proxi-
mately caused the learning deficiency of the plaintiff student." Id. (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist.,
391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (N.Y. 1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring)).
133. See id. (citing Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 114-15 (Iowa 1986)).
134. Id. (citing Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d
317, 320 (N.Y. 1979); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982)).
135. Id. at 415.
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tion of the students will not be reviewed" because courts "are not qual-
ified to pass an opinion as to the attainments of a student.""3 6
While purporting to follow the typical rule that contractual
promises must be specific and objective,1"7 the opinion is notable be-
cause the promises Ross alleged were neither particularly specific nor
capable of objective measurement. 138 The court read Ross's com-
plaint to allege the "specific promise that he would be able to partici-
pate in a meaningful way in that program because it would provide
certain specific services to him. ' 139 The court instructed the lower
court on remand to ask narrowly whether Ross "was barred from any
participation in and benefit from the University's academic program
without second-guessing the professional judgment of the University
faculty on academic matters."140
Unfortunately, the appellate court gave little guidance as to how
to answer the narrow question it instructed to be determined on re-
mand, including whether Ross enjoyed a benefit or participation in
the academic program. Moreover, by rejecting educational malprac-
tice, the appellate court made clear that the logical and common
sense types of questions one might ask about the nature of the pro-
gram were not to be considered, lest the court intrude into the class-
room. This Article will return to Ross v. Creighton University in a later
discussion of good faith14' to explore whether good faith might yield a
workable framework for evaluating Ross's "claim without second-
guessing the professional judgment of the University faculty on aca-
demic matters."1
4 2
B. The Rejection of Educational Malpractice Claims
Although many scholars and commentators have found numer-
ous sound reasons to hold colleges liable for professional negligence
claims, 43 courts have roundly refused to recognize educational mal-
136. Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Demarco v. University of
Health Sciences, 352 N.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)).
137. See id. at 416-17.
138. See id. at 417.
139. Id.
140. Id. Ross later settled the suit for $30,000. See OLIVAS, supra note 3, at 694.
141. See infra notes 192-198 and accompanying text.
142. Ross, 957 F.2d at 417.
143. SeeJody M. Alholinna, Why Johnny Still Can't Read-What Should Minnesota Do to Ad-
dress the Issue of Abysmal Test Scores Among Inner City Kids, 18 HAMLLNE J. PUB. L. & POL' 169,
177, 181 (1996) (arguing that educational malpractice claims may become more accepted
as schools improve and as social arguments for substandard achievement are given less
weight by thejudiciary); Sharan E. Brown & Kim Cannon, Educational Malpractice Actions: A
Remedy for What Ails Our Schools?, 78 WEST'S ED. L. RFP. 643, 656-57 (1993) (calling for
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practice. 44 At the very least, scholars and commentators urge recog-
nition of the tort in the student athlete context because of the grave
potential for exploitation.1 45 However, even when presented with an
ideal student athlete case, such as in Ross v. Creighton University, there
remains judicial reluctance to educational malpractice claims.' 4 6
Andre v. Pace University'47 is similarly representative of those many
cases eschewing judicial oversight of the educational product through
tort claims. In Andre, several students with very modest math and sci-
recognition of educational malpractice claims as having potential to improve schools);
Johnny C. Parker, Educational Malpractice: A Tort is Born, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 302
(1991) (asserting that "educational malpractice is a viable theory of tort liability and that
traditional negligence analysis and public policy support the recognition of such a cause of
action"); Laurie S. Jamieson, Note, Educational Malpractice: A Lesson in Professional Accounta-
bility, 32 B.C. L. REv. 899, 964-65 (1991) (arguing for recognition of educational malprac-
tice). But see Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A Tort en Ventre, 39 CLEV. L. REV. 323,
324 (1991) (arguing that educational malpractice claims should not be allowed).
There is no clear answer to the question of whether educators are professionals, a
necessary preliminary question to 'malpractice' claims as opposed to negligence. See Aq-
uila, supra, at 353-55 ("Establishing the status of education as a profession would help the
court to determine the appropriate standard of care to apply in negligence situations.");
Polelle, supra note 93, at 212-13 (discussing whether educators are professionals for pur-
poses of malpractice claims).
144. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 414-15 (refusing to recognize the tort of educational malprac-
tice and noting that "the overwhelming majority of states that have considered" educa-
tional malpractice have rejected it); CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 398, 400 (Colo.
1994) (en banc) (affirming the rejection of educational malpractice claims); Finstad v,
Washburn Univ., 845 P.2d 685, 692-94 (Kan. 1993) (rejecting educational malpractice);
Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. App. 1999) (same); Andre v. Pace
Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-80 (App. Term 1996) (same); Cavaliere v. Duff's Bus. Inst.,
605 A.2d 397, 401 (Pa. Super. 1992) (same).
145. Many authors have noted that the college athlete is tremendously vulnerable to
exploitation and that there is a great need to police this relationship judicially. SeeJohn R.
Alison, Rule-Making Accuracy in the NCAA and its Member Institutions: Do Their Decisional Struc-
tures And Processes Promote Educational Primacy for the Student-Athlete?, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 58-
59 (1995) (calling for "external pressure[s]" such as litigation to police university's treat-
ment of student athletes); Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 How. L.J. 259, 281-82 (1993) (discussing the need for
educational malpractice claims to help educate the public and to protect the student ath-
lete); Timothy Davis, Examining Educational Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a Cause of Ac-
tion Be Created for Student-Athletes?, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 57, 91-95 (1992) (arguing that a
special relationship exists between a university and a student athlete that is a sufficient
basis for allowing educational malpractice claims); Monica L. Emerick, Comment, The Uni-
versity/Student-Athlete Relationship: Duties Giving Rise to a Potential Educational Hindrance
Claim, 44 UCLA L. REV. 865, 869 (1997) (advocating the allowance of educational malprac-
tice claims in specific circumstances); Harold B. Hilborn, Comment, Student-Athletes and
Judicial Inconsistency: Establishing a Duty to Educate as a Means of Fostering Meaningful Reform of
Intercollegiate Athletics, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 741, 782 (1995) (arguing that courts "should ac-
knowledge that universities have a duty to educate student-athletes based on the special
relationship between the parties").
146. See supra note 131.
147. 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Term 1996).
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ence backgrounds sought the advice of the chairman of the computer
science department before enrolling in the computer program
course. 4 ' The chairman "assured plaintiffs in substance that their
background was sufficient to enter the graduate program and that
they would have no problems with the course." '49 The course, "Fun-
damental Pascal Programming," was "the first in a five course se-
quence of required courses" for a graduate certificate in computer
programming. 150 The course grew more challenging after the first
class;1 51 the plaintiffs encountered difficulty beginning with the sec-
ond assignment.1 52 The students solicited and received additional
help from their professor, but they still could not grasp the mate-
rial. t 53 At the fourth session, problems from the second day of class
still stymied them.154 When the students realized, after diligent work
and discussion with the professor, that their background was not suffi-
cient for the level of the course, they sought but were denied a tuition
refund. a55
The students filed suit on both contract and tort theories.1 56 The
case was tried in small claims court,1 57 and the court entered judg-
ment in favor of the students.1 58 The lower court noted the consumer
nature of the relationship:
Dr. Merritt accused plaintiffs of being "consumers and not
students." In fact, the plaintiffs are both. Students are con-
148. See id. at 778.
149. Id. Specifically, Dr. Murthy, the chairman, "assured them that the Pascal Course
did not require an advanced math background and that with their rudimentary high
school math background they could complete the Pascal Course without difficulty." Andre
v. Pace Univ., 618 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979 (City Ct. 1994), rev'd, 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div.
1996).
150. Andre, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
151. According to the lower court, the preface to the textbook selected indicated that
the course was geared toward scientists, engineers, or computer science majors. See Andre,
618 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
152. See Andre, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
153. The students tried to set up a meeting with the department chair, but he was un-
able to meet with them "[n]otwithstanding the urgency of plaintiffs' request" until after
the deadline to drop the course had expired. Andre, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
154. See id. at 977-78.
155. See id. at 978. Tuition was $1655, paid in two installments. See id. at 977. Although
they had passed the withdrawal date, as a conciliatory measure, the dean offered a tuition
credit for the following semester, which the students refused. See Andre, 655 N.Y.S.2d. at
778.
156. See Andre, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 979 (claiming breach of contract, want of consideration,
rescission, unconscionability, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, educational mal-
practice, and violation of state consumer laws).
157. See id. at 978-79.
158. See id. at 983.
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sumers of educational services. There is nothing holy or sa-
cred about educational institutions. Colleges and
Universities are in the business of marketing and delivering
educational services and Degrees to the general public. In
New York State caveat venditor has replaced caveat emptor as
the guiding principle of consumer transactions including
those involving educational services. 59
The lower court also noted that students are particularly "susceptible"
to fraud 6 ° and that by giving advice to students, educators assumed
fiduciary duties toward students.161
The court concluded that under these circumstances, an educa-
tional malpractice claim could be sustained against the institution. 162
In finding educational malpractice, the lower court noted that it was
not finding fault based on the general quality of the program or upon
a general appraisal of the soundness of the teaching. 63 The court did
not examine the quality of teaching or the classroom conduct, instead
it focused on the department chair's assurances and on the textbook
selection for the course. 164 The court noted that the text specifically
stated that it was intended for students experienced in math and sci-
ence and that use of the book "in a beginners' course . . . is a per se
example of negligence, incompetence and malpractice."165 The court
also held for the students on the breach of contract claim. 166
Pace appealed the ruling. The appellate court reversed and de-
nied the students recovery in either tort or in contract and held that
Pace was entitled to its final tuition installment payment from each
student.'67 In reversing, the court explained that it would not "enter-
tain actions sounding in 'educational malpractice"" 6 that would re-
quire the court to examine "broad educational policies" and to
"review [their] day-to-day implementation."169 Although students al-
leged that the course was taught at an advanced level despite the af-
firmative assurances of the department chair and the representations
to the contrary in the catalog, the court refused to engage "in a com-
159. Id. at 979.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 980-81.
162. See id. at 981-82.
163. See id. at 981 (citing Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982)).
164. See id. at 981-82.
165. See id. at 981.
166. Id. at 979-80.
167. Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777, 780-81 (App. Term 1996).
168. Id. at 779 (citing Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); Donohue
v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979)).
169. Id. (quoting Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354).
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prehensive review of a myriad of educational and pedagogical factors,
as well as administrative policies that enter into the consideration of
whether the method of instruction and choice of textbook was
appropriate....""0
Finally, in rejecting the contract claim, the court commented on
the character of the chairman's affirmative assurances and held that
"Dr. Murthy's representation that the plaintiffs would have no diffi-
culty with the class was mere expression of opinion which cannot give
rise to an actionable claim."'71
With the wholesale rejection of educational malpractice or con-
tract as a basis of liability, courts run the risk of leaving themselves
without an adequate role to hold schools accountable when they fail
to meet the reasonable expectations of students.'7 2 The lack of an
adequate judicial role is troubling; as many scholars have noted, it
leaves the institution without external accountability and students
without judicial recourse. 173
C. Good Faith: Finding a Judicial Role in University-Student Disputes
Courts are steadfast that viable contract claims must be intrinsi-
cally different than mere malpractice claims, i7 4 yet the distinction
they seek is often blurred.1 7 5 Good faith and fair dealing can provide
a framework to adjudicate student claims that is not unduly intrusive
in that gray area where student claims are less specific but reasonable
expectations seem clear. Although good faith and fair dealing terms
170. Id. at 779-80.
171. Id. at 780.
172. A thoughtful decision, Doe v. Yale University, No. CV900305365S, 1997 WL 766845
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1997), carefully distinguishes nonactionable educational mal-
practice from ordinary negligence and upholds a claim for the latter. See id. at *1-2.
There, a resident alleged that he received inadequate instruction prior to being ordered to
establish an arterial line in a terminally ill AIDS patient in the ICU. See id. at *1. The
resident became infected following a needle stick. See id. The court noted that the case
did not involve "purely academic decisions" or did not ask the court "to make judgments
about the quality of broad educational policies" but instead asked "the court to consider
the allegedly negligent failure of the university to provide appropriate instruction and su-
pervision in the performance of a particularly risky procedure." Id. at *4.
173. See supra note 69.
174. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing
educational malpractice claims from contract claims).
175. See Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 119 (Conn. 1996) (comment-
ing that "U]urisprudential considerations that shed doubt on the viability of the tort of
educational malpractice also inform our analysis of a contract claim based on inadequate
educational services" (citing Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (N.D. 1990),
affd in part, revd in part, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454
N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982))).
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are usually left unexpressed by the parties, courts generally agree that
these terms exist and are implied within every contract.'76 These im-
plied terms are sufficiently determinable as to justify a remedy for
breach. 177
At the formation stage, good faith and fair dealing compels hon-
esty and the avoidance of fraud and misrepresentation.1 78 At the per-
formance stage, good faith and fair dealing demands cooperation, 1
79
observation of reasonable commercial standards 18' and excludes "be-
havior inconsistent with common standards of decency, fairness, and
reasonableness, and with the parties' agreed-upon common purposes
and justified expectations.' '1 81 As one court explained, good faith re-
quires that one party "do nothing destructive of the other party's right
to enjoy the fruits of the contract and to do everything that the con-
tract presupposes they will do to accomplish that purpose."'1 82
Importantly, external sources such as custom, community stan-
dards in the academic community, literature of higher education, and
codes of ethics of professional organizations183 can provide the court
176. See, e.g., Lowell v. Twin Disc, Inc., 527 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that
"[i]t is a fundamental principle of law that in every contract there exists an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing" (citing Kirklehebon Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,
188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933); Van Valhenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publ'g Co.,
281 N.E.2d 142, 144 (1971))).
177. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 7.17, at 550-51 ("In recent years, courts have
often supplied a term requiring both parties to a contract to exercise what is called 'good
faith' or sometimes 'good faith and dealing."' (footnotes omitted)).
178. See Palmieri, supra note 7, at 151-80 ("There is substantial authority stating that the
reason why disclosures are mandated in the negotiation of a contract is that notions of
good faith and fair dealing require such disclosures."); Holmes, supra note 7, at 43549
(asserting that the duty of good faith, which leads to disclosure, lies, in part, in fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation).
179. See, e.g., Lowell, 527 F.2d at 770 (stating that "[i]t is . . . implied in every contract
that there is a duty of cooperation on both sides" (quoting Rochester Park, Inc. v. City of
Rochester, 238 N.Y.S.2d 822, 827 (Sup. Ct.), afr'd, 241 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1963))).
180. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1996) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade.").
181. Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 191 (N.H. 1989) (citing Sum-
mers, General Rule of Good Faith, supra note 7, at 826); see also Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law, supra note 7, at 196-99 (arguing that good faith "is best understood as
an 'excluder'-it is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but
which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith" (citing Hall, Excluders, 20
Analysis 1 (1959))); Burton, supranote 7, at 371 (stating that "courts employ the good faith
performance doctrine to effectuate the intentions of parties, or to protect their reasonable
expectations").
182. Conoco, Inc., v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 908 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 1979)).
183. See LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, § 1.3.2.3, at 17 (noting that whenever
the terms of the contractual understandings between the university and the student are
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with external, objective measures of implied obligations of good faith
and fair dealing."8 4 Relying on objective, external standards addresses
judicial concern that it should not substitute its own judgment for that
of the institution, while still imposing a standard of conduct upon the
institution."18 As one court observed,
Since a formal contract is rarely prepared, the general na-
ture and terms of the agreement are usually implied, with
specific terms to be found in the university bulletin and
other publications; custom and usages can also become spe-
cific terms by implication. 8 6
Only that which is reasonable may be implied. Certainly in
the period of time between a student's matriculation and
graduation, an educational institution, which is a living,
changing thing, may not reasonably be expected to remain
static; and conversely, change may reasonably be expected.
Hence, each statement in a publication of what now is true
does not necessarily become a term in the contract between
the school and the student.'87
Imposing obligations of good faith and fair dealing, derived in part
from the absence of improper motivations and in part from the edu-
cational community's own standards of conduct, allows courts to pro-
tect the greater societal interests at the root of its traditional
deference while acknowledging a need to protect students entering
.unclear, courts may look to academic custom and usage in order to interpret the terms of
the contract"); Beh, supra note 5, at 193-95 (commenting that a college's good faith and
fair dealing can be established by balancing reasonable student expectations with the stan-
dards advanced in higher education management literature and by those prescribed by
educational accrediting agencies); Nordin, supra note 69, at 165 (noting that "[r]eliance
on community custom and practice seems peculiarly appropriate to the academic commu-
nity which has managed to transmit and keep intact its unique characteristics over
centuries").
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-
103(1) (b) with approval and stating that "good faith means 'honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade'"); see also supra note
180 (providing the text of U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b)).
185. See LAw OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 3, § 1.3.2.1, at 18-19 (noting that courts
have jurisdiction "for the enforcement of obligations whether arising under express con-
tracts, written or oral, or implied contracts, including those in which a duty may have
resulted from long recognized and established customs and usages, as in this case, perhaps,
between an educational institution and its students" (quoting Strank v. Mercy Hosp., 117
A.2d 697, 698 (Pa. 1955))).
186. Peretti v. Montana, 464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Eugene L. Kramer, Note, Expulsion of College and
Professional Students-Rights and Remedies, 38 NOTRE DAE L. REv. 174, 183 (1962)).
187. Id.
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the marketplace of higher education.188 While flexibility is desirable
for the institution, without good faith and fair dealing to restrain
them, students are at the mercy of the school and societal interests are
not served. In favoring the institution's autonomy and flexibility over
student needs, one court callously commented:
Even to think that a university could be found to have bro-
ken its contract when it changed the dates of classes, or the
curriculum, for reasons beyond its control, or changed
teachers, should startle anyone at all familiar with university
life. Indeed, it should surprise them even if the changes
were simply a matter of voluntary internal policy, and they
were held invalid by the court.1 89
This view utterly fails to appreciate the extremely negative conse-
quences to a student's educational objectives that unilateral and ab-
rupt changes can have.'9 ° Moreover, it ignores the unfairness of
allowing the institution to reap the value of the consumer-student's
choice to attend its institution without assuring that it will in turn pro-
vide the student with what it promised.
Good faith and fair dealing provides a bridge between institu-
tional autonomy and flexibility and student vulnerability. Even in
those cases where a catalog provision broadly permits unbridled
changes and disclaims liability, the demands of good faith and fair
dealing in instituting changes afford some protection to students. 19 1
188. Cf Beh, supra note 5, at 188-95 (arguing for the application of good faith in evalu-
ating college program closures); Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of
Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 695-99 (1995) (urging application of
the implied obligation of good faith to discriminatory treatment in college athletics).
189. Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 713 F.2d 881, 885 (1st Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
190. See Beh, supra note 5, at 175-76 (commenting on students' frustration and disap-
pointment when a college cancels a degree program and noting how "[t]here simply may
be no other acceptable alternative for some students when an institution closes" (citations
omitted)); Cf Peretti v. State, 777 P.2d 329, 331 (Mont. 1989) (noting that seven out of the
sixteen terminated students failed to achieve their desired career goal after their program
was canceled); Lesure v. State, No. 89-347-II, 1990 WL 64533, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18,
1990) (noting that following the loss of accreditation, the student became a respiratory
technician, with less earning potential, rather than a respiratory therapist); Behrend v.
State, No. 80AP-328, 1991 WL 3591, at *1 (Ohio App. 1981) (describing the downward
adjustment of student educational goals and the outcomes when a program closes).
191. See Beh, supra note 5, at 190-91 (commenting that students in a legal relationship
could expect good faith and fair dealing with a university (citing Beukas v. Board of Trust-
ees, 605 A.2d 776, 784 (1991))). But see Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111,
120-22 (Conn. 1996) (finding that the occasional "positive feedback" during medical resi-
dency and dismissal in the fourth year did not constitute a breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing).
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Returning to Ross v. Creighton University'9 2 and Andre v. Pace"'9 to
examine how to determine whether the institutions acted in good
faith is instructive. In Ross, a court might have examined whether
there was evidence of bad faith during recruitment; for example, did
the school even assess Ross's academic ability or did it focus exclu-
sively on his athletic talents; did the school know that its program was
educationally inadequate to meet Ross's needs; did the school misrep-
resent the nature of the academic support program to Ross through
their written or oral communications; and did the school follow the
ethical tenets of the professional organizations to which it be-
longed.194 In evaluating good faith during performance, the court
might have examined whether Creighton provided any tutoring pro-
gram at all, and if so, whether it was comparable to other academic
support programs at other institutions, whether adequate resources
were devoted to the program, or whether the tutors held credentials
similar to tutors at other similar schools. The court might have asked
whether Ross's practice schedule left him adequate time for class,
tutoring, and studying. The court might have asked whether the
school engaged in ethical conduct toward Ross, as demanded by mem-
bership in the NCAA.195 These questions avoid significant intrusion
into how Creighton taught or failed to teach Ross. 19 6 Instead, these
questions focus on the objective reasonableness of the program in
comparison to similar programs, external standards of good practice,
and any evidence of bad faith and improper motives.197 This result is
192. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
193. 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 1996).
194. See generally 1999-00 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, Principles for Conduct of Intercollegiate
Athletics art. 2, at 2.01-2.16 (1999) [hereinafter NCAA] (outlining guidelines for members
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association); NATIONAL ASS'N OF ACADEMIC ADvisoRs
FOR ATHLETES, CODE OF ETHICS art. II, sec. 2 C (1997) (requiring members to "always repre-
sent program offerings, course offerings and majors in a truthful and appropriate manner,
especially when dealing with recruits"); see also notes 41-48 and accompanying text (regard-
ing ethical conduct).
195. See NCAA, supra note 194, art. 10, at 10.1 (discussing the ethical conduct of NCAA
members, and noting, for example, that it is unethical for an employee of the institution to
arrange for "fraudulent academic credit or false transcripts").
196. Cf Wirsing v. Board of Regents, 739 F. Supp. 551, 553 (D. Colo. 1990) (stating that
"[t]he 'four essential freedoms' of the university are to determine for itself on academic
grounds: 1) who may teach; 2) what may be taught; 3) how it shall be taught; and 4) who
may be admitted to study" (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J. concurring))). See generally Olivas, supra note 10, at 1835-37 (discussing
academic freedom).
197. As Ross made his selection among colleges as a high school senior, he likely as-
sumed that Creighton's academic support for athletes was at least comparable to other
athletic programs. Indeed, while students do not generally "know" what a college should
be like, they expect some sort of "commercial reasonableness" to what is provided to them.
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more satisfying than complete abdication of judicial oversight in that
it can protect students from exploitive conduct while still according
deference to academic decisions.' 8
Returning to Andre v. Pace, a similar inquiry might have been pro-
ductive. In Andre, the appellate court rejected the contract claim,
viewing it as a reformulated malpractice claim, stating that "[i]t is
clear that the essence of plaintiffs' breach of contract claim necessarily
entails an evaluation of the adequacy and quality of the textbook used
and the effectiveness of the pedagogical method chosen. . . ."" Less
intrusive questions, however, might have been asked to determine
whether Pace acted in good faith. For example, to determine whether
Pace acted in good faith at the formation stage, the plaintiffs might be
allowed to adduce evidence of whether these students shared similar
math and science backgrounds to others who commonly took the
course or whether the school encouraged these students to enroll in
order to fill an otherwise undersubscribed class, thus showing an im-
proper and bad faith motivation for encouraging the students' enroll-
ment. At the performance stage, the court might have considered
whether the withdrawal deadline was a reasonable policy in compari-
son to other institutions and whether the administration's delay in
meeting with students and responding to the students' timely com-
plaints violated the good faith standards of fairness and decency.20 0
The vacuum left by judicial abdication is apparent in Andre. The
opinion is not satisfying because it reinforces the arrogance of an in-
stitution that mocked students for expressing their reasonable expec-
tations; "Dr. Merritt accused the plaintiffs of being 'consumers and
not students.' '2 0  The Andre decision gives short shrift to these stu-
dents who informed their college advisor prior to taking the course of
their limited math ability and experience; who each agreed to pay
$885 to take a course they soon realized was completely unsuitable for
them; who despite diligent work, failed to master the subject matter;
and who attempted to complain in a timely manner without suc-
See Nordin, supra note 69, at 158-60 (suggesting that the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions is well suited to define the student-university relationship); McJessy, supra note 87, at
1796 (arguing for the application of reasonable expectations principle which "if applied by
the courts in a consistent manner, would provide the necessary guidance universities need
... to structure their relationships with their students").
198. See Nordin, supra note 69, at 158-60 (commenting that a "reasonable expectation"
test would exclude extrinsic evidence as to what the parties agreed upon and simply rely
upon what is "reasonable" in the college-athlete relationship).
199. Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779 (App. Term 1996).
200. See supra note 153 (discussing evidence that the school delayed meeting with the
students).
201. Andre v. Pace Univ., 618 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (City Ct. 1994).
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cess. 2° 2 In this case, regardless of whether the students would ulti-
mately prevail or not, contract law's implied obligations of good faith
and fair dealing return dignity to students and provide a role for the
court without intruding into the classroom. As one scholar
commented,
Even a highly idealistic community can develop conflicting
interests and different ideas of right activity. The judiciary is
peculiarly suited for the balancing of rights and the weaving
of constitutional standards and the university could use the
gentle guidance of the courts to evolve clearer standards of
procedures and more codified concepts of academic custom
and usage. It is terribly important to our society that college
students be taught not only the theory but the practice of
democratic usage, even in private associations.2 °3
Student claims should not prevail when schools exercise good
faith in modifying or disbanding programs, otherwise an institution
might stagnate. Marquez v. University of Washington2 °4 is illustrative of
this point. There, a "specially admitted" law student was promised for-
mal tutorial assistance as part of the terms of his special admission
status. 205 During the student's first year, the school made a determi-
nation to disband the formal program "[d]ue to student concern
about stigmatization and a general dissatisfaction with the student
tutors .. ."206 There was no evidence that this decision was not made
"in good faith" for exploitive or otherwise improper motives, and the
court characterized the termination of the program as a "reasonable
modification of the Law School's academic assistance program. '"207
Thereafter, the student was offered informal, unstructured academic
assistance including "faculty assistance outside the classroom," "small
class sections," "a rigidly structured legal writing and research pro-
gram," and "the possibility of taking lighter course loads" in lieu of the
formal program. 2 " The student had a troubled academic history at
law school; he was academically dismissed and readmitted following
his first year and finally terminated after academic failure in his sec-
202. See id. at 977-79. The Pace policy only permitted full refunds prior to the first
scheduled class but no refund at all by the fifth class meeting. See id. at 978; see also supra
notes 147-171 and accompanying text (describing, in detail, the facts of Andre).
203. Nordin, supra note 69, at 148.
204. 648 P.2d 94 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
205. Id. at 95.
206. Id. at 97 n.1.
207. Id. (citing Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 592 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1976)).
208. Id. at 97.
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ond year.20 9 The student complained that the school failed to provide
the formal tutoring it had promised on his admission. 210 The court,
however, determined that the modification of the program was per-
missible, having been "made in a good faith exercise of its educational
responsibility."2 1
The good faith and fair dealing inquiry is well-developed in
Beukas v. Board of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson University,212 and dem-
onstrates the concept's usefulness in balancing competing interests.21 3
There, Fairleigh Dickinson University decided to close its dental
school when it lost 38.1% of the dental college budget and faced a
$6.2 million dollar deficit without internal resources to cover it.214
The school suspended admissions to the dental school and worked
with its accrediting agency to retain accreditation through graduation
of the admitted students. 21 5 The school also assisted those students
who desired to transfer to other institutions. 216 The school obtained
monies from the State of New Jersey to give tuition subsidies to "make
up the tuition difference. "217
Students filed suit, claiming that their admission into the dental
college and payment of the first year's tuition created a binding con-
tract with the institution including an implied term that the school
would continue in existence. 218 The court acknowledged competing
interests and recognized that universities need discretion to make "ad-
ministrative decisions to terminate an academic or professional pro-
209. See id. at 95.
210. See id. at 95-96.
211. Id. at 97 n.1 (citing Mahavongsanan, 592 F.2d at 450); see also Keles v. New York
Univ., No. 91 CIV. 7457, 1994 WL 110525, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994) (allowing the
school to change its rules limiting the number of times a student may take qualifying exam-
inations so long as changes are not "arbitrary and capricious").
212. 605 A.2d 776 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), affrd, 605 A.2d 708 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992) (per curiam).
213. See Beukas, 605 A.2d at 784. A similar approach has been identified in the student-
athlete relationship. As with other student-university relationships, courts struggle to de-
fine the legal obligations of a school to its recruits when vaguely defined academic or
athletic promises and expectations are unfulfilled. See generally Robert N. Davis, The Courts
and Athletic Scholarships, 67 N.D. L. REV. 163, 195-96 (1991) (discussing the contractual
nature and the legal obligation involved in the relationship between the student athlete
and the university); Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University's Educa-
tional Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REv. 743, 788-91 (1991) (same); Timothy
Davis, Balancing Freedom of Contract and Competing Values in Sports, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 1115,
1141-45 (1997) (same); Hilborn, supra note 145, at 748-50 (same).
214. See Beukas, 605 A.2d at 778.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 778-79.
217. Id. at 779.
218. Id.
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gram on the grounds of financial exigency. '219 In a novel twist, the
court decided that the university-student relationship was not purely
contractual, but was quasi-contractual, 220 noting that "[t]he 'true'
university-student 'contract' is one of mutual obligations implied, not
in fact, but by law;... 'for reasons of justice without regard to expres-
sions of assent by either words or acts."' 22  Beukas then asked the diffi-
cult question, how much protection do affected students deserve
"under circumstances where the university has unilaterally deter-
mined to terminate an entire college for financial reasons?" 222
The court held that the university must act in good faith and deal
fairly with students and explained how future courts might examine
good faith and fair dealing:
Had defendants acted arbitrarily; had they refused to avail
themselves of reasonably available alternative funding; had
they failed to promptly disclose the withdrawal of state fund-
ing; had they lulled plaintiffs into believing the funding
would be restored; or had they failed to make proper ar-
rangements for transfer of plaintiffs to other dental schools,
thus causing a delay in plaintiffs' opportunities to pursue
their educational goals, the situation would be different. 2
23
The court noted that good faith will give courts a comfortable role
that balances judicial deference with the need for judicial oversight.
The broad construction of the student-university relationship, cou-
pled with a generous dose of contractual good faith gives courts a
workable standard that still provides deference to institutional
autonomy:
This approach will give courts broader authority for examin-
ing university decisionmaking in the administrative area than
would a modified standard ofjudicial deference and will pro-
219. Id. at 781.
220. Id. at 783-84.
221. Id. (citing West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 138 A.2d 402 (1958), quoting from ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONrRA=CS § 19 (1952)); see supra text accompanying note 138 (noting
that the decision in Ross v. Creighton University, 957 F.2d 410, 417 (1992) was not based
upon express or upon specific promises); see also I SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTrRAcrs § 1:6, at 25 (4th ed. 1990) ("Quasi contractual
obligations are imposed by the courts for the purpose of bringing about a just result with-
out reference to the intention of the parties."); 3 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTs § 1494 (2d ed. 1920) (tracing the history of quasi-contract development).
222. Beukas, 605 A.2d at 781.
223. Id. at 784.
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duce a more legally cohesive body of law than will applica-
tion of classic contract doctrine ....224
III. CONCLUSION
Almost twenty years ago, Professor Virginia Nordin argued that
courts needed a workable framework to hold universities accountable
for their administrative and business judgments-as opposed to disci-
plinary and academic decisions-and that contract law held such po-
tential.225 She complained that judicial opinions were not "unified or
consistent in their application of the contract approach."226 Thejuris-
prudence of higher education is no more clear today. Moreover, to-
day's consumerism and marketing practices make the case for a
stronger judicial role even more compelling. Without a well-defined
judicial role, the unchecked deference accorded to institutions leaves
students vulnerable and without adequate remedy when institutions of
higher education place their own economic and commercial goals
over their students' educational needs.227
Courts are understandably reluctant to step into the middle of
university-student disputes. They correctly note that it is inappropri-
ate to substitute their own judgment for the institution's academic
and management decisions. Courts, however, must find a comforta-
ble and unobtrusive role that acknowledges the consumer nature of
the student-university relationship and demands more accountability
from the institution. After all, students potentially have foregone
other opportunities and purchased an educational product based on
promises and on representations that the institution made to induce
them to enroll. 228 Ignoring the consumer nature of the relationship
allows the institution too much discretion.
The implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing give courts
an appropriate role that allows the right mix of discretion and ac-
countability. By asking schools to abide by the standards in the educa-
tional community and to refrain from decision-making for improper
motives, courts can provide at least some protection to students while
not usurping the university's autonomy.
224. Id. While Beukas was affirmed on appeal, the appellate court did not discuss good
faith and fair dealing, instead noting that the disclaimer in the catalog would allow pro-
gram closure. See Beh, supra note 5, at 192 (citing Beukas v. Board of Trustees, 605 A.2d
708 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)).
225. Nordin, supra note 69, at 178-79.
226. Id. at 179.
227. See id. at 149-51 (discussing the increase in the "'business' or academic-administra-
tive function of the university").
228. See id. at 151 (discussing Behrend v. State, 379 N.E.2d 617 (1979)).
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